

# Managing Large-Scale Security Events: A Planning Primer for Local Law Enforcement Agencies



April 2018



# **Managing Large-Scale Security Events: A Planning Primer for Local Law Enforcement Agencies**

Prepared by the Police Foundation in partnership with the Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA), U.S. Department of Justice and BJA National Training and Technical Assistance Center.

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# Acknowledgements

The Police Foundation Team would like to thank the staff of the Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) for their support and guidance on this effort, especially Denise O’Donnell, BJA Director (retired) and Tracey Trautman, Acting BJA Director. We also wish to extend thanks to the BJA National Training and Technical Assistance Center (NTTAC), especially Rebecca Rose and Anu Madan.

Special thanks to Commissioner Richard Ross and the Philadelphia Police Department, Chief Calvin Williams, Deputy Chief Tomba and the Cleveland Police Department. We are grateful also to Philadelphia Office of Emergency Management Director Samantha Phillips and her staff. These leaders and their agencies graciously provided their time and assistance to scheduling interviews and coordinating site visits, providing materials for our team to examine, access to their agencies and activities during the Convention, and reviewing drafts that led to this final document. We are particularly grateful for the access provided by all of the officers and staff of each of the host cities throughout this project; without your openness and candor, we would not have been able to gather the information to provide to future host sites.

Finally, thank you to the following Police Foundation staff who helped to drive the work of the project and provided valuable insight, review and guidance to the Team that conducted research, went on site visits, participated in interviews and conference calls, and wrote and edited this document. Without the individuals listed below, this document, and this project, would not have been completed:

- Jim Bueermann, President;
- Blake Norton, Vice President and Chief Operating Officer;
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- Rebecca Benson, Senior Policy Analyst;
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- Joyce Iwashita, Project Assistant.

## Managing Large-Scale Security Events

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A Planning Primer for Local Law Enforcement Agencies

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# Executive Summary

Large-scale events provide local governments with a number of valuable opportunities, including increasing tourism and revenue; showcasing host city venues and attractions; and, working with the community to create a positive narrative about the city and its public safety agencies by serving as a welcoming host for a premier event.

However, with these benefits comes even greater responsibility. Local government leaders must ensure that the planning and coordination of large scale events are carried out in a way that balances Constitutional rights and civil liberties with security, accounts for the public's safety from a growing variety of threats, and considers public health implications. These responsibilities primarily fall to local law enforcement. Large-scale events also come with increased scrutiny of public safety agencies from the media, civil rights organizations, attorneys, and other watch groups.

Law enforcement executives tasked with managing a large event can maximize their efforts by learning from other agencies, adopting best practices and strategies, adapting to evolving environments and threats, and leveraging new tools and technologies. Too often, however, these strategies, best practices, and lessons learned are not documented in a clear and concise manner. To address this information gap, the U.S. Department of Justice's (DOJ) Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) worked in partnership with the Police Foundation to update this Planning Primer originally created by the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) following the 2012 Presidential Nominating Conventions.<sup>1</sup>

This updated Planning Primer is based primarily on the 2016 Presidential Nominating Conventions. While the examples and best practices throughout the Primer are geared towards agencies that receive federal grant funding—primarily from BJA—for managing security at large-scale events, they are applicable to any large-scale law enforcement event, including responses to critical incidents. Therefore, it also documents best practices and lessons learned from other large-scale events and critical incidents, and highlights emerging threats and research that have occurred since.

This Planning Primer details best practices and lessons learned pertaining to security planning and implementation for a large-scale event, specifically pre-event planning, core event operations and strategies, and post-event activities. The Planning Primer includes information regarding 19 core operational areas that law enforcement executives can give to lead public safety planners as supplemental guidance. This can be used as the foundation for coordinating area-specific operational plans and can be modified to accommodate event security requirements and existing protocols. Furthermore, accompanying each operational area presented in the Planning Primer are actionable templates, checklists, and key considerations designed to facilitate the planning process (see Appendix A: Planning Toolkit).

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<sup>1</sup> Police Foundation team members conducted a review of past after-action reports for large-scale special events and used first-hand observations and analysis of the Cleveland, Ohio, Division of Police and the Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, Police Department as they planned, executed, and debriefed operations for the 2016 Presidential Nominating Conventions. Bios of the team members are included in Appendix E.



## 19 Core Operational Areas

- Administrative and Logistics Support
- Command and Control
- Credentialing
- Crowd Management
- Dignitary/VIP Protection
- Emerging Technology and Possibilities
- Financial/Grant Management
- Fire/Emergency Medical Services/Hospitals/  
Public Health
- Intelligence/Counter-terrorism/Counter  
surveillance
- Interagency Communications and  
Technology
- Legal Affairs
- Non-event Patrol
- Arrest Processing
- Protecting Critical Infrastructure and  
Utilities
- Public Information and Media Relations
- Screening and Physical Security
- Tactical Support and Explosive Device  
Response/Hazardous Materials
- Training
- Transportation and Traffic Management

## Major Observations

This executive summary highlights major findings learned from previous police departments related to planning, finances, logistics, operations, and command of a large-scale security event. While many of the major findings remain the same, the strategies and tactics, timelines, and tools—all explained below and throughout this Primer—have changed significantly since the original primer was published.<sup>2</sup>

### *Planning*

During large-scale events, the potential exists for disorderly conduct and violence, conflicts between individuals and groups involved, and increased risks to officer safety and wellness. Therefore, it is important for local law enforcement to actively engage in strategic and collaborative planning internally and with all partners, stakeholders, community members, and local and national groups that intend on attending and/or demonstrating during the event. Planning involves the following four steps:

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Develop a **strategic vision** centered on establishing a welcoming and safe environment.

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Law enforcement executives should develop an overall philosophy that prioritizes safety and security during the event while emphasizing engagement and de-escalation, Constitutional rights and civil liberties, and minimizing arrests when possible. This philosophy should be accompanied by specific tactics, strategies, policies, and procedures to guide all law enforcement officers involved. To ensure that the philosophy and specific components are implemented, plan to provide all officers with trainings and resources codifying these key elements.

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Create a **core planning team** to oversee major decision-making and planning.

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Local law enforcement should begin by establishing clear, formal oversight processes or mechanisms to ensure that decision-making is strategic and unified. The lead local agency should establish a core planning team immediately upon being selected to host a large-scale event. The

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<sup>2</sup> These areas are the five major management functions of the Incident Command System.



planning team should be staffed with personnel from each of the key participating agencies—for example police, fire, and emergency management agencies—as well as with personnel who have expertise in grants management policies and legal contracts. This team should establish standardized procedures and forms to be used by all stakeholders, identify single points of contact for the 19 core operational areas identified above, and create timelines and accountability measures for all partners and stakeholders. The personnel selected to serve on the core planning team should have the appropriate authority to identify, assign, and ensure the completion of tasking identified for event preparedness and conduct. Core planning team personnel should be entirely relieved of regular duties during preparation for the event to be able to focus their time and attention on all of the critical aspects of planning for an event of this magnitude. The team should review existing policies and protocols, such as those on use of force and safeguarding first amendment rights to make sure they are up to date and consistent with national best practices.

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Conduct **formal and informal meetings** with stakeholders to walk through cross-cutting activities and to develop relationships.

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The nature of the event will require collaboration among a multitude of local, state, regional, and federal entities, each with their own roles and responsibilities. Formal and informal meetings with these stakeholders are invaluable for establishing solid relationships. Having these relationships established and delineating roles and responsibilities prior to a large-scale event can streamline every aspect of the process of hosting, particularly planning and procurement, coordinating crossing-cutting activities in operational plans, and following up after the event has ended.

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Develop **scalable plans** that can be altered should intelligence indicate that differing resources are required.

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Large-scale security events will likely initially require worst-case scenario planning; however, as the event nears, information and intelligence may indicate that fewer resources are required to safely secure the event. In response, local law enforcement should establish plans that are flexible and can accommodate changes in resource demands.

### ***Finances***

Financial management is a critical component of effective command, security, and accountability. Therefore, it is important for local law enforcement to be mindful of the following:

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Be aware of federal grant making procedures and timelines, and understand that **funding is often made available later than desired**.

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One of the biggest challenges planning jurisdictions can face is financing pre-event procurements prior to receipt of grant funds. Costs incurred prior to the effective date of the award or project period may not be reimbursable under the grant. If funding is not appropriated or received by the jurisdiction's desired timeline, it may incur—and consequently absorb—unforeseen costs. Therefore, the lead jurisdiction should be prepared to leverage its own funding, use the

Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC)<sup>3</sup>, leverage resources from neighboring agencies, and/or engage its State Administering Agency (SAA) to address pre-award and other costs that cannot be covered by the federal award. The SAA can serve as a resource for guidance on the federal grant procedures and timelines. SAAs can also provide personnel and resources to conduct the financial aspects of managing the grants as well as assistance in strategically leveraging other resources.

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**Begin planning with careful attention to reimbursable costs and special conditions.**

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Executives must be cognizant of funding procedures, special conditions, and guidelines for reimbursable costs. Especially when federal funding is being used, it is imperative to read, understand, and abide by all special conditions attached to the award, and to have the necessary documentation and receipts accounted for during monitoring visits and audits. The assigned staff should also be familiar with the provisions of the DOJ Financial Guide. In addition, accurately building a precise budget breakdown early in planning and having all procurement requests go through one agency, or the core planning team, may help to avoid the absorption of unallowable costs later on. Therefore, key financial and decision-making staff from the lead local jurisdiction—along with any personnel that will be providing assistance in handling the financial aspects of the grant—should complete OJP’s financial management training as soon as possible after being selected to host a large-scale event.<sup>4</sup>

### ***Logistics***

Administrative and logistics support requires 24-hour care to all law enforcement and supplemental personnel throughout an event. It is important for local law enforcement to be mindful of the following when planning and coordinating this effort:

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**Do not underestimate the large scope of caring for visiting officers.**

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One of the largest and most complicated tasks that law enforcement will need to engage in is ensuring that all security personnel are cared for. Rest and relaxation sites should be strategically positioned throughout the city so that all officers can take advantage of them when they have breaks. “The wellness and safety of law enforcement officers is critical not only to themselves, their colleagues, and their agencies but also to public safety.”<sup>5</sup> Officer wellness services, such as access to gyms and other recreational activities, should be made available for out-of-town officers to enjoy during their off-duty time. When planners take into account the health and

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<sup>3</sup> The EMAC, “acts as a complement to the federal disaster response system, providing timely and cost-effective relief to states requesting assistance from assisting member states who understand the needs of jurisdictions that are struggling to preserve life, the economy, and the environment.” More information on the EMAC can be found throughout this document as well as at <https://www.fema.gov/pdf/emergency/nrf/EMACOverviewForNRF.pdf>.

<sup>4</sup> For more information about OJP Financial Training and Technical Assistance, visit, <https://ojp.gov/financialguide/DOJ/index.htm>.

<sup>5</sup> President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing. 2015. Final Report of the President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing. Washington, DC: Office of Community Oriented Policing Services.

wellness of the officers assigned to these large scale security events, officers are better positioned to carry out their expected roles, even in strenuous situations. Agencies who have hosted large-scale security events repeatedly note that officer care is a large undertaking that can often be overlooked.

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Understand that officer logistics have **many overlapping planning components**.

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Care of officers encompasses a broad range of overlapping planning components and often becomes a catch-all function. Logistics for officers includes elements of transportation, food and beverage, housing, scheduling and timekeeping, credentialing, and ensuring health and wellness. It is critical to ensure ample staff is assigned to support this function.

### *Operations*

A number of operational elements will be executed during the event, many of which will require the heightening of normal security operations. In addition to these activities, law enforcement can execute effective strategies to maximize resources and ensure a safe environment, including the following:

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Provide **officer training** that focuses on non-confrontational team policing and the protection of Constitutional rights.

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Officer training should focus on educating all officers—especially those from out-of-town—on the overall strategy for the event, as well as departmental policies and procedures and approved tactics for interacting with crowds and demonstrators. Training should emphasize the importance of maintaining a balance between protecting Constitutional rights and the need to protect persons and property from injury and damage. Trainings should be spread across multiple platforms including online, classroom and scenario-based tabletop exercises, and in-person drills. Scenario training, exercises, and drills can prepare officers to remain unprovoked to demonstrators that try to bait and elicit negative responses. Online trainings can also ease the burden on providing out-of-town officers before they get on-site and help reinforce the local laws and policies and procedures. Furthermore, law enforcement executives play a vital role in instilling this message of non-confrontational policing, not only with officers, but with the public and demonstrators as well.

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Use and enhance only **proven and pre-established technologies**.

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For a large-scale security event, security planners should avoid using new technology systems and equipment that they have not had the opportunity to use in trainings or other large-scale events, as unforeseen technical challenges may arise. Instead, law enforcement should focus on enhancing existing tools and processes that have proven successful within the department.

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Use **dual-sport vehicles and bicycles** to effectively manage crowds and maneuver across large distances.

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Field forces should be deployed on bicycles and in dual-sport vehicles (as opposed to on foot or horseback) to manage crowds and demonstrators in an efficient and timely manner. Bicycle

officers tend to be seen by attendees as more approachable and friendlier and they are able to make rounds on a regular basis to ensure safety and security of all. Bicycle Units are also able to provide slightly more mobility than those on foot, allowing officers to provide assistance during movement of parades and marches. In these regards, Bicycle Units can be extremely positive and appreciated by demonstrators. When needed, bicycles can also serve as physical barricades for directing large crowds.

### ***Command***

Law enforcement responds to a wide range of security incidents and operations that are typically handled by a single unit or department. However, large-scale security operations require a different approach and structure. Therefore, local law enforcement executives should consider the following actions:

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**Deploy local police executives in the field to facilitate real-time decision-making and maintain a constant and engaging presence to the public.**

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An effective strategy for local law enforcement is to position local agency leaders including police chiefs, commissioners, and/or commanders in the field during demonstrations. By being present in the field, executives can assess a situation first-hand and determine the best tactics to deploy. Since these local leaders have a vested interest in de-escalating situations before they develop into larger issues, they can personally engage members of the crowds and set the example for line officers at the scene. As an added bonus, leaders often have the media following to further highlight the positive presence of law enforcement officers in the field. Response decisions can also be communicated to field forces faster when they come directly from command staff nearby, thus diffusing the escalation of potentially unruly behavior from demonstrators.

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**Maintain situational awareness by combining and sharing information directly from officers in the field and utilizing technology.**

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Public safety agencies should ensure that they maintain situational awareness throughout the event. Situational awareness plays a large role in resource allocation, identifying and proactively addressing issues, and ensuring overall safety and security of events. Deploying all uniformed officers with body-worn cameras (BWCs) can provide a multitude of perspectives from multiple areas around the event and help determine if additional resources are needed during a large gathering or demonstration. Especially with new technology that allows for BWC footage to be live-streamed to an agency's headquarters—along with cameras from dashboards; surveillance systems; smartphones; and helicopters, unmanned aerial systems (UASs), and other aircrafts—this could provide real-time citywide situational awareness for law enforcement executives and other important decision-makers. Pictures and videos gathered from social media can also enhance situational awareness.

It is also important to remember situational awareness provided by personnel—both in uniform and undercover—in the field. Information from the field shared with incident commanders who are not in the field, allows them to make timely and well-informed response decisions.

## Conclusion

Carefully planned security operations and multi-agency coordination before, during, and after a large-scale security event are paramount to local law enforcement's ability to maintain a safe environment and to conduct a successful event. With this Planning Primer, law enforcement departments and agencies nationwide can benefit from the lessons learned and proven practices of other agencies. The detailed activities in the Planning Primer and the interactive Planning Toolkit serve as useful instruments for lead planners as they develop operational plans around the 19 core operational areas. By having solid plans and policies, sufficient equipment, and trained personnel in place, law enforcement will be prepared for incidents and can help to ensure public safety throughout event operations.

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# Section 1: Introduction

Large-Scale Security Events (LSSEs) provide local governments with a number of valuable opportunities, including increasing tourism and revenue; showcasing the city and its venues and attractions; and, working with the community to create a positive narrative of the city and its public safety agencies by serving as a welcoming host for a premier event.

However, with these benefits comes greater responsibility. Local government leaders must ensure that the planning and coordination is carried out in a way that balances Constitutional rights and civil liberties with security; accounts for the public's safety from a growing variety of threats; and considers public health implications. While there are opportunities for local government officials to take a lead role in contributing to the positive citywide approach—primarily through de-criminalizing misdemeanors commonly associated with mass gatherings and demonstrations, allowing camping in public parks where it is traditionally prohibited, and extending liquor licenses of bars and restaurants—the responsibilities to ensure safety and security fall primarily to local law enforcement. Along with these responsibilities, large-scale events also come with increased scrutiny of public safety agencies from the media, civil rights organizations, attorneys, and other watch groups.

While many large-scale security events do not deviate greatly from typical law enforcement operations—including dealing with public intoxication, traffic control, or acts of violence—some events do garner additional security due to their high-profile nature. Large-scale events pertaining to political, economic, social, or religious themes have the potential to adversely impact public safety and security. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has designated some of these events as National Special Security Events (NSSEs). NSSEs include events such as Presidential Nominating Conventions, large sporting events such as the Olympics, international summits, elections, and presidential inaugurations.



To ensure that large-scale events and NSSEs are carried out safely, securely, and efficiently, a number of agencies and organizations must collaborate to perform a variety of functions. Local law enforcement's primary role in these large-scale events is to develop a comprehensive security plan that focuses on maintaining everyday policing activities; providing event site security, traffic, and crowd management; and, security of non-official event venues. This role is more distinguishable in NSSEs where local law enforcement must work collaboratively with the U.S. Secret Service (USSS) to ensure event security coincides with local security efforts. In these events, it is important for local law enforcement and federal partners to work collaboratively to



ensure the compatibility of plans. At the same time, it is the responsibility of the lead local jurisdiction to develop and implement a comprehensive local operations plan.

## 1.1 Background

Detailed documentation to guide local law enforcement through the planning and operations of a large-scale security event is sparse. To address this information gap, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) worked with the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) following the 2012 Presidential Nominating Conventions in Tampa, Florida, and Charlotte, North Carolina, to develop the initial Planning Primer, entitled *Managing Large-Scale Security Events: A Planning Primer for Local Law Enforcement Agencies*. Realizing the significant evolution of law enforcement equipment, technology, tactics, strategies, policies, procedures; best practices and lessons learned; and, the political and law enforcement environments, BJA worked in partnership with the Police Foundation to revise and update the original Planning Primer after the 2016 Democratic National Convention (DNC) in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and the 2016 Republican National Convention (RNC) in Cleveland, Ohio. The primary goal of this update is to build on the experiences of subject matter experts (SMEs) that had previously hosted LSSEs and NSSEs—including the chiefs of the 2012 and 2016 DNC and RNC host cities—to update and further inform a comprehensive Planning Primer that documents best practices and lessons learned regarding security and planning operations.

## 1.2 Methodology

Prior to the event, Police Foundation staff and SMEs (Police Foundation Team) conducted one visit to each of the national convention sites.<sup>6</sup> During these site visits, Police Foundation Team members conducted the following activities:

- *Conducted Key LSSE Interviews* – Team members interviewed key members of convention security planning teams, including Cleveland Division of Police & Philadelphia Police Department personnel, including command staff; City officials, including EOC Directors and other public safety agency personnel; and state and federal partners including USSS Special Agents and Assistant Special Agents in Charge.
- *Attended LSSE Coordination & Security/Law Enforcement Meetings and Trainings* – Team members attended relevant NSSE Coordination & Security meetings; observed and documented key decisions; attended training sessions and reviewed intelligence reports; and, collected relevant data for analysis in both cities.
- *Direct Observation* – Team members visited convention centers; observed surrounding areas and popular ingress and egress routes, including public transportation terminals; and observed other relevant locations and activities.

In preparation for each of the site visits and for the national convention itself, Police Foundation Team members reviewed planning documents, relevant policies and procedures, meeting minutes, training materials, interagency coordination and surge planning strategies, and presentations that the lead planners provided from the Philadelphia Police Department (PPD) and

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<sup>6</sup> Police Foundation conducted the initial site visits to Cleveland and Philadelphia from July 6 – 9, 2016.

the Cleveland Division of Police (CPD). Police Foundation Team members also researched and reviewed open source media articles; national standards and best practices in relevant areas of policing and LSSE policy and practice; after action reports from previous LSSEs, NSSEs and critical incidents; and other identified relevant issues.

Police Foundation Team members were also present in each convention city during conventions to observe and document the operations of the City of Cleveland and the CPD and the City of Philadelphia and the PPD.<sup>7</sup> In particular, they noted key decisions at local law enforcement agencies' major nodes of engagement, including police command centers, multiple operations centers such as the USSS Multi-Agency Command Center and Emergency Operations Centers, and in the field.

After the two events, the Police Foundation Team members focused on four primary activities to develop this Planning Primer:

1. Interviewing City of Cleveland and CPD and City of Philadelphia and PPD law enforcement personnel. Police Foundation Team members sought input and feedback from the event operators by conducting follow-up interviews and conference calls with core city, public safety, and law enforcement planners in the weeks following each convention.<sup>8</sup> These meetings helped Police Foundation Team members gain the operators' perspectives on issues, highlight best practices and lessons learned, and identify possible recommendations for future host agencies.
2. Developing Quick-Look Reports on the DNC and RNC that documented best practices and lessons learned for each hosting jurisdiction.<sup>9</sup> These documents, as well as the Quick-Look Reports CNA developed for the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department and Tampa Police Department in 2012, served as the basis for the analysis and findings incorporated into this revised and updated Planning Primer.
3. Reviewing previous law enforcement agencies' planning and operations of securing large-scale security events. This review included a literature review of existing planning guidance; department policies and procedures; and After-Action Reports (AARs) from the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department (CMPD) (2012 RNC); the Tampa Police Department (TPD) (2012 DNC); and, the AARs from other large critical incidents including the response to the 2013 Boston Marathon Bombing, the police response to the August 2014 demonstrations in Ferguson, and the 2015 San Bernardino Terrorist Attacks. This review also included direct contributions and feedback from SMEs who had hosted previous Presidential Nominating Conventions.

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<sup>7</sup> The 2016 RNC was held Monday, July 18 through Thursday, July 22, 2016. The 2016 DNC was held Monday, July 25 through Thursday, July 29, 2016.

<sup>8</sup> Police Foundation Team members attended a post-event debrief meeting in Philadelphia, PA, on August 23, 2016 and conducted phone interview debriefs with representatives from Cleveland, OH, on September 2 and October 25, 2016.

<sup>9</sup> Key findings for the DNC were documented in a Quick-Look Report titled, "The Philadelphia Police Department Protection of the 2016 Democratic National Convention: A Quick-Look Analysis of Public Safety Best Practices and Lessons Learned." Key findings for the RNC were documented in a Quick-Look Report titled, "The Cleveland Division of Police Protection of the 2016 Republican National Convention: A Quick-Look Analysis of the Public Safety Best Practices and Lessons Learned."

4. Incorporating feedback and observations, writing, and vetting from the Police Foundation team of subject matter experts who had hosted previous large-scale events and NSSEs, including both of the 2012 Presidential Nominating Conventions.

Through these activities, the Police Foundation in partnership with BJA revised and updated this comprehensive Planning Primer which synthesizes best practices and common security planning and operational themes for future planners, senior leaders, and decision-makers to implement for large-scale security events.<sup>10</sup> All law enforcement agencies, regardless of size or designated event, can benefit from the guidance identified in this Planning Primer.

### 1.3 Report Organization

The format of this Primer allows readers to easily refer to the operational area most related to their planning and operational responsibilities. The templates, listed in Appendix A, provide supplemental material for these efforts and are also organized by operational area. Broadly, this Primer covers the three major phases of managing a large-scale security event:

- Pre-event planning
- Operational management
- Post-event operations

**Section 2** contains critical information for getting started on event planning, including key considerations for initiating internal department planning and developing an operational plan.

**Section 3** contains information on planning and executing event operations. This section is organized by 19 core operational areas that are most important for event planning and operations:<sup>11</sup>

1. Administrative and Logistics Support
2. Command and Control
3. Credentialing
4. Crowd Management
5. Dignitary/VIP Protection
6. Financial/Grant Management
7. Fire/Emergency Medical Services (EMS)/Hospitals/Public Health
8. Intelligence/Counter-terrorism/Counter Surveillance
9. Interagency Communications and Technology
10. Legal Affairs
11. Non-event Patrol
12. Arrest Processing


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<sup>10</sup> Although this document was primarily updated using the lessons learned and observations made during the 2016 RNC and DNC, the best practices and themes noted throughout this primer are applicable to large-scale event security planning and operations.

<sup>11</sup> Police Foundation identified these areas using the original *Managing Large-Scale Security Events: A Planning Primer for Local Law Enforcement Agencies* developed by CNA and interviews with officials from Cleveland and Philadelphia.

13. Protecting Critical Infrastructure and Utilities
14. Public Information and Media Relations
15. Screening and Physical Security
16. Tactical Support and Explosive Device Response/Hazardous Materials
17. Training
18. Transportation and Traffic
19. Emerging Technologies and Possibilities

Command level officers and the police department's internal planning team may use appropriate sections for planning activities within their assigned operational area and/or subcommittee. Depending on the operational area, the information provided may be relevant to all large-scale security events or more specifically to only NSSEs. These activities are distinguished using the following coding:



**Section 4** explains the demobilization process and the importance of writing an AAR.

Following the body of the report are five appendices:

**Appendix A** presents the Planning Toolkit, which contains templates and checklists for local law enforcement planners to use when planning and conducting operations for a large-scale security event. Planners should remember that these documents are guides and should be scaled to the event and tailored to the specific needs of the department/agency.

**Appendix B** presents a summary of the key planning considerations for each of the 19 core operational areas described in Section 3.

**Appendix C** presents a summary of overarching planning considerations.

**Appendix D** presents a list of acronyms.

**Appendix E** presents a list of bios of Police Foundation Team members.

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## Section 2: Pre-event Planning

A significant portion of the security effort consists of pre-event planning. Planning should begin with a core planning team immediately upon notification that a large-scale event will be held in a given jurisdiction, and should be done in earnest at least 12-18 months prior to the event. This section focuses on general lessons learned for planning and developing the event operational plan. Specific operational planning components are discussed in greater detail in Section 3.

### 2.1 Initiate Internal Department Planning

Given the nature of hosting a large-scale event, local departments should anticipate an intense and exhaustive planning process. Lead planners must emphasize the importance of expediently initiating internal department planning and should be relieved of regularly assigned duties in order to focus on the planning process.

Initiating Internal Department - Planning Checklist		
	Key Steps	Completed <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
●	Review Lessons Learned from Previous Large-Scale Events and Other Mass Demonstrations	<input type="checkbox"/>
▲	Begin Planning Immediately; Do Not Wait for Federal Guidance	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Develop a Strategic Vision	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Identify a Lead Planner for the Department	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Determine Authorities of Participating Agencies	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Establish a Local Core Planning Team	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Understand that Operational Plans will Remain in Flux	<input type="checkbox"/>
<b>KEY:</b> ● Large-Scale Security Events and NSSEs ▲ NSSEs		

#### ● *Review Lessons Learned from Previous Large-Scale Events and Other Mass Demonstrations*

Realizing the significant evolution of law enforcement equipment, technology, tactics, strategies, policies, procedures; best practices and lessons learned from other large-scale events and critical incidents; and, the political and law enforcement environments, BJA worked in partnership with the Police Foundation to revise and update the original Planning Primer after the 2016 Presidential Nominating Conventions. This Primer will document best practices and lessons learned, highlights emerging threats, and include research that has occurred since, but will also pull from previous successes and lessons learned. In fact, the best place to start planning is to reach out to other jurisdictions that have prior experience planning for similarly scaled events. For example, in preparing for the 2016 Presidential Nominating Conventions, both CPD and PPD noted that reaching out to law enforcement agencies in prior host cities—including Charlotte, North Carolina; Denver, Colorado; St. Paul, Minnesota; and Tampa, Florida—was beneficial to the planning process. These agencies helped to provide a better understanding of planning assumptions and other event-related expectations.

Additionally, valuable insights and information regarding the importance of many of the topics that arise in a large-scale event including communications and information-sharing, public and

media relations, maintaining situational awareness, technology and equipment, training, and command and control can be gained from reviewing the AARs from other large critical incidents including the response to the 2013 Boston Marathon Bombing, the police response to the August 2014 demonstrations in Ferguson, and the 2015 San Bernardino Terrorist Attack.

### ▲ *Begin Planning Immediately; Do Not Wait for Federal Guidance*

There is no pre-set operational plan template for NSSEs. Various jurisdictions have noted that they were somewhat hesitant to begin developing plans as they awaited official guidance from their federal partners. However, local planners are responsible for developing their own operational plan regardless of the designated lead agency. Additionally, especially in NSSEs, federal agencies are only responsible for security and credentials in the particular event venue and the directly-surrounding perimeter. Local planners are still responsible for all of the areas outside of the security perimeter and for all of the venues where other events occur. Planners can use knowledge gained from visiting other cities to start planning at least six months **prior** to the arrival of the USSS designated security planning co-chair. The checklists and references provided in Appendix A (“Planning Toolkit”) will help planners to identify the key components of building and completing a comprehensive local operational plan.

### ● *Develop a Strategic Vision*

#### **BEST PRACTICE**

Emphasize the importance of the Constitutional rights of all attendees, particularly the First Amendment, by reading it at roll calls, handing it out at trainings, and displaying it prominently for officers.

Developing a strategic vision is critical to governing both planning and operations. Given the political nature of Presidential Nominating Conventions and other NSSEs, the potential exists for political activism and protests. Even at other LSSEs, organizations may seek to take

advantage of the fact that there will be multiple media outlets by demonstrating. As such, planners must work closely with conflict resolution groups and known activist groups to understand how to adapt their policing styles/techniques to ensure the protection of the civil rights and civil liberties of all of the attendees (including activists, patrons, delegates, and VIPs). This work should include law enforcement leaders establishing relationships and rapport with leaders of these groups. Together, these groups should identify any intended large demonstrations or gatherings and explain the process to obtain permits, agree on rules of acceptable behavior and set expectations of one another, share rules of engagement and use of force continuums, and discuss processes and procedures. These meetings should begin significantly before the event happens and continue throughout the process, and should include a debrief after the event, to ensure that both sides have an opportunity to reflect and learn from one another.

Planners must also establish a mission to protect the Constitutional rights of all attendees while providing a peaceful and safe environment. It is critical that the strategic vision and mission are shared with the entire planning team, reinforced through training, and monitored during the event. Police chiefs and their command staff should promote the vision and mission to their officers, and emulate them in the field.



### ● *Identify a Lead Planner for the Department*

A lead local planner for the host department helps to ensure that commitments and plans across various subcommittees are appropriately vetted and coordinated. The lead planner:

- has decision making authority and is a command-level officer;
- serves as the incident commander for the planning phase, ensuring coordination among each of the various planning functions; and,
- reports directly to the Chief of Police and other city leaders to ensure buy-in and concurrence on all aspects of the local security plan.

The lead planner should also be supported by a core planning team—explained later in this section—to ensure that the planning decisions are communicated to, and accounted for in, the relevant subcommittees.

### ● *Determine Authorities of Participating Agencies*

Authority for event security planning and operations is often the responsibility of the local law enforcement agency that has operational control over the jurisdictional area. Public-facing<sup>12</sup>, arrest, and processing authorities are the most important to designate to local and host jurisdictions. In addition to being the most important to control the overall tone of enforcement and to embrace police-community relations, and especially since media attention will be focused on number of arrests and the way arrests are handled, ensuring that the message is positive and

that the lead local agency is responsible and accountable is imperative. However, other agencies inside and outside of law enforcement

#### **BEST PRACTICE**

Public-facing, arrest, and processing authorities are the most important to designate to local and host jurisdictions.

will likely serve key functions critical to successful security operations. Neighboring law enforcement agencies (including those with events in their jurisdiction) and other mutual aid partners should be brought to the table early to engage in the planning process. If grant funds are used to support personnel costs, these funds are typically administered by the lead agency. There must be an open and transparent process for those funds to be distributed among mutual aid partners to cover personnel and security event expenses and to related events in neighboring jurisdictions. Regardless of how many agencies are involved, there should be a single local police department to serve as the lead liaison between local response partners and all other partners for the purpose of developing the components of, and implementing, the event security plan. In this role, the local police department will identify key stakeholders (which may include agencies outside of law enforcement) that will have authority over security-related operations. Activities that are typically outside of the local police department's responsibility include communications, fire/emergency medical services/public health response, transportation management, tactical/explosive support, consequence management, emergency management, and recovery. It will be the police department's responsibility to utilize the Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) to identify agencies and personnel to provide these services and complement its staff, and to coordinate the inputs of these stakeholders into the event security operations plan.

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<sup>12</sup> Public-facing activities are those in which attendees and law enforcement officers are most-likely to encounter one another. They include crowd engagement and management, directing vehicular and pedestrian traffic around site(s)/venue(s), escorting demonstrators and marchers, and front-line security.

● *Establish a Local Core Planning Team*

Establish a core planning team to oversee and resolve issues between the subcommittees during the planning process, and to mimic the Incident Command System (ICS) structure that is used during event operations. Staff this core planning team with personnel from each of the key participating agencies, as well with personnel that have expertise on grant policies and legal contracts. Ensuring the right personnel—individuals with the appropriate experience, attention to detail, and forethought—are assigned to the right positions on this planning team is essential to the effectiveness of the team and to the overall planning and operations. This is more important than selecting individuals based on rank and seniority. The personnel on the team should ensure that decisions are not being made without the awareness of agencies that will be responsible for carrying them out.

**BEST PRACTICE**  
 Create a Core Planning Team that can maintain oversight of all local planning and operations.

Members of the core planning team should be assigned to monitor the activities of all event-related planning entities. The core planning team should be established immediately upon notification that a large-scale event will be held in a given jurisdiction and personnel assigned to

this team should be relieved of regularly assigned duties in order to focus on the planning process.

● *Understand that Operational Plans Will Remain in Flux*

Throughout the planning and operational phases, certain aspects of the operational plan will remain in flux. It is important to accept this burden early in the planning process and to remain flexible and prepared for both anticipated and unforeseen changes such as changes to event venues, scheduling and resource conflicts, itineraries, VIP attendance, and ad hoc security requirements. For example, planners may need to react to the cancellation of several events due to severe weather or the reallocation of staff as venue locations are changed. Additionally, resource allocations may need to be adjusted mid-event to account for unforeseen circumstances. Flexibility will ensure that last-minute changes do not result in any adverse security implications.

**2.2 Develop the Operational Plan**

The operational plan will be the most important output of the planning process. The operational plan should provide essential information relevant to all agencies and stakeholders supporting the event including the overall vision and mission, agency-specific operational plans, job aids and descriptions, roles and responsibilities, key policies and procedures, key contacts, and contingency plans. The completeness and efficacy of this plan will be a result of the coordinated effort of local, state, regional, federal, and private-sector partners.

Developing the Operational Plan- Planning Checklist		
	Key Steps	Completed <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
▲	Staff and Engage in Subcommittees	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Coordinate and Participate in Planning Groups	<input type="checkbox"/>

Developing the Operational Plan- Planning Checklist		
●	Identify and Include Supporting Agencies and Organizations	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Develop Scalable Plans	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Test the Operational Plan Prior to the Event	<input type="checkbox"/>
<b>KEY:</b> ● Large-Scale Security Events and NSSEs ▲ NSSEs		

### ▲ *Staff and Engage in Subcommittees*

For a NSSE event, the USSS will recommend the formation of subcommittees<sup>13</sup> to focus on and develop specific plans for its operational area. Local law enforcement should be actively involved in the initial coordination of subcommittees and should determine whether additional subcommittees are required. Since there are more than 20 committees and subcommittees involved in an NSSE operation and each subcommittee requires a representative with departmental decision-making authority from the lead agency, this can place an additional burden on local public safety agencies that have critical roles in the event. In instances where the hosting jurisdiction is overburdened, assistance should be sought from other local participating agencies that can communicate with the lead agency fluidly. It is important that local planners recognize that additional subcommittees may not be in the scope of interest for the USSS and thus will not be part of their planning packages and preparation.

Create an Executive Steering Committee (ESC), comprised of agency representatives across multiple jurisdictions responsible for maintaining situational awareness across planning subcommittees, ensuring that decisions made by subcommittees do not contradict or conflict with decisions made by other subcommittees, and that any gaps in decision-making are identified and rectified as soon as possible.

### ● *Coordinate and Participate in Planning Groups*

Determine planning work groups or subcommittees early to ensure ample time for developing planning considerations and assumptions. Ensure that group members represent the agencies responsible for implementation and with the appropriate expertise. For example, the technology planners should include someone from the City IT Department that will be able to inform the process, but will also know the limitations of collection, storage, and communication of large data files (including images and videos). The logistics/asset identification planners will need time to research the best methods of supporting personnel and identifying appropriate rest and rehabilitation locations, and the staffing and housing planners will need time to recruit the proper number of personnel and secure housing to keep costs reasonable. When identifying planning group members, be creative but also be sure that the group doesn't grow too large or broad. Focus on the following activities for security operations:

- Define the scope and goals;
- Assess staffing and resource capabilities;
- Identify and procure appropriate resources;

<sup>13</sup> The term “subcommittee” refers to the planning groups that the USSS forms for planning major NSSE operations. This term differs from “operational area,” which is one that we use in this document to categorize and highlight the core functions we feel are important to event planning and operations. In many cases, operational areas will be assigned and covered in one or multiple subcommittees.

- Create collaborative partnerships with various government, community, and business entities; and,
- Develop policies, procedures, and training and organize them into a realistic and comprehensive operational plan.

In LSSEs that do not involve USSS subcommittees, assign local law enforcement personnel as co-chairs on planning groups or subcommittees with a public safety mission and as participants on the remaining subcommittees. Meet regularly to ensure that subcommittee planners and command-level personnel maintain situational awareness of planning activities and can make key strategic decisions in a timely manner.

### ● *Identify and Include Supporting Agencies and Organizations*

Develop relationships with supporting agencies and organizations with operational responsibilities related to security of the event, including federal law enforcement agencies such as the USSS, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and the U.S. Marshals; local, state, and regional law enforcement and public safety agencies; and, outside organizations. Meet with interagency partners regularly (on a weekly or monthly basis) to coordinate planning operations, and to build effective working relationships to form a foundation of collaboration and teamwork during the event. Additionally, consider allowing local agencies outside of the lead agency to oversee individual aspects of the security in its entirety such as transportation of delegates, hotel security, and low-level escorts.

Potential supporting organizations may include:

- Event Promoters/Sponsors;
- Emergency services agencies such as fire/rescue, emergency medical services, public health and safety; and, neighboring Emergency Managers and agency representatives to coordinate mutual aid needs;
- Local planning agencies and individuals such as community development agencies, city planners, and hazard-mitigation planners;
- Local emergency planning committees for hazardous materials information;
- Public works agencies and utility companies;
- State supporting entities, including the State Emergency Management Agency or National Guard;
- Social service agencies and volunteer organizations such as the American Red Cross and Salvation Army— including animal care and control organizations;
- Medical community representatives such as area hospitals, EMS agencies, medical examiners, coroners, and morticians;
- Communications representatives such as Public Information Officers, city spokespeople, and media personalities;
- Aviation and coastal authorities such as state aviation authorities, other air support representatives, port authorities, and U.S. Coast Guard stations;

#### **BEST PRACTICE**

Hold regular formal and informal meetings with interagency partners to develop effective working relationships.

- Chief Financial Officers, auditors, the State Administering Agency (SAA), and heads of any centralized procurement and resource support agencies;
- Business and retail communities, religious leaders, leaders of community groups, and other organizations that are directly impacted by the event and/or are likely to attend or demonstrate;
- The jurisdiction’s legal counsel and leaders from labor and professional organizations; and,
- Leaders of area facilities, including industrial and military installations, schools, and universities.

### ● *Develop Scalable Plans*

Constantly assess operational plans for efficacy based on intelligence reports and other available event data including how many people will be attending and the weather forecast during the event. Begin planning for the worst-case scenario to cover all potential security threats, however, develop plans that are scalable and can reduce or reallocate the planned workforce and resources should intelligence information indicate otherwise. For example, if less criminal activity occurs or fewer event patrons attend, identify other functions that personnel can carry out and other places to allocate those resources. De-escalation plans should be a primary planning assumption that is included in all relevant security plans and account for outside factors such as geographic location, travel for outside agencies, and available mutual aid.

### ● *Test the Operational Plan Prior to the Event*

Conduct numerous multi-agency, multi-disciplinary exercises to identify potential gaps in the planned response once required entities have drafted their sections of the operational plan and all of the components are unified to form the jurisdiction’s operational plan. A variety of exercise types may be employed, and senior leadership should determine what type of exercise may best benefit their operations and which partners should be involved in which exercises. Regional public safety partners—including law enforcement, fire, EMS, and emergency management—as well as other government and nongovernment agencies, when appropriate, should be included in exercises that proceed through the entirety of the event and the potential aftermath of an incident at the event.<sup>14</sup> For each of these exercises, it is also important to decide who should be exercised: the decision-makers, the operators, or both. The following types of exercises should be considered:

- **Tabletop Exercise:** A discussion-based exercise typically involving senior leaders that is aimed at identifying knowledge gaps for authorities and participants pertaining to information contained in the operational plan. This type of exercise is best administered earlier in the planning phase, as outputs will be used to modify and amend planning guidance.
- **Functional Exercise:** An operations-based exercise that allows participants to test their operational knowledge of plans, policies, and procedures. This type of exercise should be

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<sup>14</sup> Braziel, Rick, Frank Straub, George Watson, and Rod Hoops. 2016. Bringing Calm to Chaos: A Critical Incident Review of the San Bernardino Public Safety Response to the December 2, 2015, Terrorist Shooting Incident at the Inland Regional Center. Critical Response Initiative. Washington, DC: Office of Community Oriented Policing Services.

conducted closer to the event date—after participants receive training on the operational plan—to test the implementation of plans and to assess whether additional training is needed. This type of training can be delivered online to out-of-town officers, to ensure that they are prepared when they arrive onsite.

- **Rehearsal of Concept Drill:** This type of exercise typically involves the use of scenarios or vignettes of incidents that may occur during a large-scale security event. These scenarios provide participants with the opportunity to discuss their agency’s actions based on these plausible situations. A key focus might be resource allocation, allowing participants and planners to make assertions or determine whether their planned response assets will adequately meet the potential needs of the event. These exercises, including reality-based training on a regular basis, are important for personnel who will come into direct contact with demonstrators/protestors to build their capacity regarding interpersonal interactions and equipment deployment.

In addition to pre-scripted exercises, host agencies should test their plans during regularly scheduled large-scale events such as Fourth of July celebrations and other events. Evaluating public safety coordination and response during these events will allow local agencies to assess their operational plans and to make changes based on lessons learned during these activations and ensure that commanders who will be assigned a responsibility actively participates in that role in real-time circumstances. This allows for observation of their decision-making and ability to adapt and provide additional training if necessary. Pre-event exercises also help planners to ensure that draft plans will adequately establish appropriate response guidelines and procedures.

Training that takes place in public view, particularly scenario-based and tactical training exercises, should be deconflicted with other agencies that may be operating in the same area in anticipation of the actual event, including pre-event surveillance and other non-uniformed deployments. Deconfliction should take place using traditional contacts with local agencies as well through the nationwide deconfliction efforts of the Regional Information Sharing Systems (RISS).<sup>15</sup>

### ***Toolkit References***

The following planning matrix, assessment form, and template (found in Appendix A) can be used to begin pre-event planning:

- A.1 Pre-event Planning Matrix, Page A-5
- A.2 Hazard Vulnerability Assessment, Page A-7
- A.3 Operational Plan Template, Page A-11

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<sup>15</sup> See <https://www.ncirc.gov/deconfliction/> for additional information.

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# Section 3: Core Operational Areas

This section provides lessons learned and major considerations for 19 core operational areas. Each section covers: a brief description of the operational area; an overview of key strategies in a planning checklist; an in-depth description of each strategy supported by lessons learned; and references included in the appendices that can be used to develop the event security plan. The core operational areas are listed in alphabetical order and are not ranked in order of importance.

## 3.1 Administrative and Logistics Support

Administrative and logistics support requires 24-hour care to all law enforcement and supplemental personnel throughout an event. This care encompasses a broad range of activities and often becomes a catch-all function. Activities include planning for and managing event logistics; coordinating officer assignments; coordinating with vendors; obtaining officer lodging and nourishment; arranging for officer transportation; capturing and tracking all officials and unofficial demonstrations, parades, protests and other events that have an impact on resource allocation and scheduling city services; keeping contact information for executives of each of the public safety agencies with a critical role; coordinating procurement and resource requests; and, reviewing timesheets and payments for officers involved.

Administrative and Logistics Support - Planning Checklist		
	Key Steps	Completed 
●	Engage in Collaborative Planning	<input type="checkbox"/>
▲	Work with Federal Grant Partners	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Acquire an Appropriate Number of Personnel	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Obtain Necessary Equipment	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Focus Resources on Proven Systems and Technologies	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Develop an Operational Plan for Logistics	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Practice Plans and Protocols	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Determine Staffing Requirements, and Track and Demobilize Officers	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Collaborate with Vendors and Ensure Accountability	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Provide Fixed and Mobile Nourishment Sites for Officers	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Coordinate Lodging for Officers	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Arrange for Officer Transportation	<input type="checkbox"/>
<b>KEY:</b> ● Large-Scale Security Events and NSSEs ▲ NSSEs		

### ● Engage in Collaborative Planning

Partnerships and collaboration are critical to acquiring and coordinating logistics resources. Planners should quickly identify other entities that can contribute to planning efforts including federal and state agencies, or outside law enforcement agencies; fire departments; health departments; city agencies and business support services; project managers; vendors; or property owners. Local businesses and community partners may be able to provide resources and logistical support in the form of venues or donations such as cash, water, food, or first aid

supplies during the event. Additionally, ancillary agencies may have useful resources and perspectives that they can contribute to the event. For example, school districts may be able to provide buses to transport out-of-town officers and their athletic facilities for officers to workout in during the event.

In addition, communication between logistics personnel through regular meetings is critical. Since logistics activities are dependent upon other event security efforts, lead logistics planners should collaborate with other planners on activities that are likely to have implications on logistics such as delegate/VIP protection, airport and other relevant public transportation police, venue security (see 3.15 Screening and Physical Security), and credentialing.

### ▲ *Work with Federal Grant Partners*

#### **BEST PRACTICE**

Work closely with federal funding agencies, and partners such as the State Administering Agency (SAA), to ensure that expenditures are appropriately catalogued, tracked, and accounted for. Ensure accurate timekeeping and procurement records during planning, which will save time during post-event financial auditing and prevent unallowable costs.

For NSSEs, agency liaisons should work regularly with the State Administering Agency (SAA) and federal funding authorities to properly communicate specific resource and funding needs. Since SAAs have long-standing relationships with federal funding agencies, liaisons should work closely with the SAA of their state to become familiar with financial processes and protocols to ensure that they are compliant with grant guidelines and

requirements when procuring equipment or making logistics purchases. Knowledge of these guidelines is critical to avoiding financial impacts and obstacles during and after the event, when all financial expenses are closely audited. Section 3.6 details the federal financial process and key considerations when receiving federal funding. It is important for the Host City to begin discussing funding processes and concerns with relevant partners (i.e. the SAA) immediately upon being awarded an NSSE to provide ample time to identify and address areas in which the SAA may be able to provide assistance and resources. However, it is also important to understand the relationship between federal appropriation of funds and procurement and expenditures of any type. Jurisdictions can continue planning and Appendix A-12 can help guide the discussion.

## State Administering Agencies

While some host cities of LSSEs elect to keep BJA grant funding at the local level, some may elect to utilize State Administering Agencies (SAAs) to assist to manage and administer the grant. SAAs can offer a myriad of resources, knowledge, and relationships for host agencies to leverage so that they can focus on the complex logistics of the LSSE, leaving the SAA to many of the administrative details.

- *Grant Administration* – Many SAAs have expertise and knowledge on staff to provide focused, detail-oriented support in submitting applications; dealing with federal, state and local procurement guidelines and processes; submitting reimbursement request; reporting; and, other grant administration details.
- *Finance* – Long after the crowds have left, there will be bills to pay and partners to reimburse for their time, talents, and assets during the LSSE. SAAs can work to help host agencies budget and ensure bills are paid in a timely fashion in the aftermath of the event. SAAs will also assist host agencies in following federal spending guidelines so that when the federal Office of the Inspector General arrives to conduct the final audit, host agencies are ready.
- *Leveraging Relationships* – Often, through their work in administering grants and other state functions, SAAs have relationships with many criminal justice and other governmental agencies, vendors, non-profits, and other organizations that they can leverage to support host agencies during LSSEs.
- *Acting as Conveners* – In many instances because SAAs work with organizations both in and outside of the state as part of their business, they are used to acting as conveners of diverse organizations to accomplish goals and complete projects. They are able to leverage these skills to bring organizations together to support the needs of the LSSE and the host city.
- *Specialized Skills/Technical Assistance* – Through professional networks and/or on-staff skills, SAAs can provide specialized skills and technical assistance as necessary to support the LSSE.
- *Providing Additional Resources* – SAAs can bring to bear a wide network of people and organizations to leverage for last minute need of equipment or other necessities.
- *Navigating the Federal Funding Process* – Funding and procurement processes at the federal level can be a labyrinth of restrictions, special conditions and additional requirements. SAAs often have vast experience in these areas that can assist host cities in navigating these details, ensuring a smooth process.

To find the State Administering Agency contact in your state, go to <https://ojp.gov/saa/>.

### ● *Acquire an Appropriate Number of Personnel*

It is easy to undervalue the demands that will be placed on administrative and logistics support personnel during the planning phase. During previous large-scale security events, staffing for planning and operations was often underestimated by law enforcement planners, causing assigned planning staff to be overburdened. Lead planners should ensure that ample personnel are assigned to logistics and administrative support during both the planning phase and the operational phase. Additionally, personnel in positions that can be scaled from other duties based on need can be given support responsibilities. Specifically, more than one person—ideally people from the core planning team or the Executive Steering Committee established earlier—should be responsible for overseeing the coordination of the following logistical planning activities: operational logistics and field resource requests, vendors, officer transportation, and officer lodging. During planning, these leaders should not be expected to maintain regular job duties while planning for the event, so they have adequate time to focus on planning.

#### **BEST PRACTICE**

Plan reserve resources and logisticians to ensure flexibility of forces to quickly respond to unforeseen complications.

### ● *Obtain Necessary Equipment*

In addition to staff, a variety of specialized equipment—such as bicycles and utility terrain vehicles (UTVs), additional smartphones, body-worn cameras, information-sharing and GIS software, helmets, bullet-proof vests, vehicles, or uniforms—may be required to enhance security operations. Below are some important strategies for assessing, procuring, and tracking equipment:

- **Assessment:** Conduct a needs assessment to identify existing equipment and needed equipment. This assessment should always include a discussion about whether or not the equipment may be rented instead of purchased, in order to maximize the use of federal funds. Use the Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) and work with interagency partners to see if resources can be borrowed and/or leased to minimize costs of having to procure new equipment.
- **Procurement:** Based on the needs assessment and the resources that were able to be obtained through the EMAC, develop broad “target lists” of equipment to purchase, which can later be scaled down to critical items if budgets do not permit the acquisitions. Provide strict deadlines for agencies to submit resource requests and require that all requests have agency leadership approval. This is a helpful strategy to ensure that all possible needs are identified in a timely fashion and is a good way to avoid incurring higher costs associated with rushed orders and expedited shipping rates. Acquire equipment early to allow time for testing and training, especially for newly acquired technologies. Additionally, if there are certain items that are imperative, but may not be reimbursable or may take longer to obtain federal approval for, consider setting aside or allocating City resources to obtain those items.
- **Tracking:** Assign one or two persons to ordering and receiving equipment, in order to reduce uncoordinated and duplicative efforts. The logistics unit should also develop a tracking system for all equipment as it is procured, assigned to officers, used in the field, and collected during demobilization. Such a system will allow the department to maintain accountability of where equipment is, who is using it, and how it should be reallocated, if

needed. The logistics unit should work closely with their local government procurement office, to assist with procurement, purchasing, and tracking of equipment prior to the event.

Other important strategies include assigning equipment to officers before the event begins so that personnel have time to become familiar with it and establishing and educating officers on demobilization protocols to ensure all equipment is collected and tracked at the completion of the event.

Agencies should not be afraid to over-plan. In the event that equipment manufacturers, vendors, or facility managers cannot meet order capacities and timelines or back out weeks or even days prior to the event, these contingencies will allow for flexibility.

### ● *Focus Resources on Proven Systems and Technologies*

Focus on acquiring equipment that your agency is familiar with, especially technologies. Agencies may become overwhelmed with offers, suggestions, and solutions to handle the event. Though new tools may be appealing, departments should adhere to

#### **BEST PRACTICE**

Avoid acquiring new technologies and systems. Focus on known tools that can enhance existing resources.

those that have been proven successful within the department or other agencies that have hosted large-scale events. Implementing new tools may or may not have the intended effect of improving operations. Additionally, it will likely require a great deal of effort on the front end and administrative/logistics support and will likely create a significant amount of additional work for city and county IT staff to ensure that the infrastructure exists to support any technological enhancements. Therefore, instead of focusing on a series of new technologies and systems, focus on making deliberate and researched technological enhancements to existing systems to ensure effective operational capabilities. These enhancements can include adding additional surveillance cameras to an existing network or bolstering motorcycles capabilities for field forces. Regardless, test communication system surge capacities of all types before the event.

### ● *Develop an Operational Plan for Logistics*

A well-organized logistics plan describing check-in and time-keeping processes and forms, equipment distribution and return, FAQs, specific points of contact for each of the key areas, and feeding/sleeping accommodations is critical for setting the tone for the event. Develop a logistics operational plan in coordination with interagency partners that includes the following elements:

- **Logistics command assignments and contact information:** Include the names, assignment, and contact information of logistics command staff.
- **Organizational chart:** Detail reporting mechanisms between the logistics commander, field operations supervisors, operations support, mobile distribution, vendors, volunteers, etc.
- **Mission and goals:** Include statements declaring the roles and responsibilities of the logistics unit—such as providing 24-hour support to all personnel in the form of nourishment, hydration, sanitation, and/or rest and rehabilitation (R&R)—and the overall public safety mission and goals for the event.

- **Events and operational dates:** Provide an overview of the event, when the logistics unit will be operational, and how/where the unit can be contacted.
- **Communication protocols:** Include details regarding communication mechanisms such as radios or phones for various logistics activities.
- **Timeline of expected key events:** Describe employment-related event activities, such as when staff will be activated, when sites will be set up or taken down, when vendors begin deliveries of equipment or food, and when meals will be scheduled.
- **Execution plan:** Include details for meal schedules; key staff assignments and contact information; details on major and auxiliary facilities/locations including addresses, staffing, related activities, and photos; and, other supplemental information on site security, vehicle maintenance, vendors, parking, and/or fueling.

### ● *Practice Plans and Protocols*

If time allows, even if it is only a couple days before the event itself, exercise plans that are specific to the event—plans that are not standard operating procedures—prior to the event. At a minimum, conduct tabletop exercises to test capabilities and contingencies, but multi-agency and multi-disciplinary reality-based trainings are most effective. For example, prior to the 2016 DNC the City of Philadelphia hosted the 2015 Papal Visit/World Meeting of Families and the City of Cleveland used the Cleveland Cavaliers championship parade prior to the 2016 RNC to practice their operational plans, in addition to practicing during several smaller events. This practice allowed them to identify key personnel needs, field-test their plans, note various shortfalls in planned operations, and make appropriate adjustments to compensate for concerns.

### ● *Manage and Coordinate Officer Support*

One of the most important tasks for the security of an event is to ensure that all venues, VIPs, crowds, and traffic posts are sufficiently staffed. Some strategies to accomplish appropriate staffing include:

- **Conduct a needs assessment:** Conduct a needs assessment of personnel to acquire sufficient staff for various posts. Identify the priority positions—such as bike officers, demonstration-engagement officers, and logistics planners—that will serve as the foundation for the overall approach to the event and to managing attendees and demonstrators and ensure early on that an appropriate number of individuals are allocated to these posts. Designate staff to coordinate officer assignments early on, in anticipation of staffing resources from other agencies that might be changing up through the start of the event and that might require rearrangements of officer assignments. Plans should include a staffing contingency for last minute assignments and for flexibility of staff in scalable positions. For example, if the intent is to limit arrests, have a scalable arrest processing plan where the unneeded staff can serve in other capacities, allowing for more flexibility for field officers and other personnel.
- **Create a database to track officers:** Develop a database or use an existing one—such as WebEOC or similar platforms—to accurately track officer job assignments, shifts, and timecards. Tracking assignments allows command-level staff to maintain situational

#### **BEST PRACTICE**

Develop a system that has both tracking and reporting capabilities, to keep commanders up-to-date on officer assignments.



awareness of officers and resources deployed and to make staffing and resource adjustments if a security incident occurs. Tracking assignments is also valuable for ensuring communication and collaboration between multiple operations centers and between operations centers and officers in the field. Tracking assignments and deployments is also imperative for keeping officers accountable of their timecards and accurately conducting payroll after the event. When developing tracking protocols and systems, logistics personnel should consider the following:

- Establish a time-tracking process for outside agencies;
  - Ensure existing databases have the ability, or develop one, to create job assignment reports for commanders during the event;
  - Ensure that the system allows for multiple assignments if it is necessary to alter officers' assignments/posts;
  - Use resource-tracking software, such as Radio Frequency Identification, to track personnel and their equipment. Conduct a test of the system prior to the event to identify potential downfalls or technical glitches; and,
  - Develop backup time tracking methods, such as written time logs, in the event that electronic tracking systems do not work in certain locations or there are technology glitches.
- **Collect and maintain officer timecards:** Obtain officers' completed timecards and accurately track days of departure during demobilization. This will ensure that overtime and travel compensation are accurately captured. Personnel should also be mindful that personnel tracking and accountability may require time and effort post event.

### ● *Collaborate with Vendors and Ensure Accountability*

Coordinating meals for a large number of officers in multiple locations throughout the city requires close collaboration with outside vendors. Conduct a comprehensive, city-wide assessment of current contracts to understand the scope of existing contracts and prevent duplication of efforts. Planners can reach out to existing and new vendors to acquire event resources. Become actively involved and familiar with—and ensure that public safety agency executives, city attorneys, and if needed the SAA are involved in—the bidding process to ensure that resources are properly acquired and details of contacts are properly understood by all parties.

#### **BEST PRACTICE**

Be actively involved in the bidding process for contracts to ensure that resources are properly acquired and that both parties understand the contracts.

Vendors should be held accountable for understanding and meeting their responsibilities and timelines to ensure that resources are provided in the appropriate manner. Planners can encourage accountability by conducting taste tests, performing site visits, and having vendors join in on planning meetings. Anticipate that

vendors will have different questions, complaints, and concerns regarding event logistics than law enforcement usually encounter.

Leverage the additional capacities that vendors and community organization such as volunteer groups may be able to provide whenever possible. For example, vendors can be used to provide off-site delivery to prevent the overstretching of logistics staff capabilities. Additionally, community organizations and volunteers may be willing to provide assistance and food. If your budget allows, consider hiring an outside contractor to work with the core planning team or



Executive Steering Committee to manage the larger logistics challenges, like a large feeding operation. Even though hiring a contractor can be costly, it could save law enforcement a lot of time and personnel that could be used elsewhere for the event.

### ● *Provide Fixed and Mobile Nourishment Sites for Officers*

All personnel assisting in the security operation will need to be fed and hydrated at least once per shift, with a likelihood of two meals, depending on shift-length. Fixed R&R sites are typically used to attend to officers' needs. However, mobile feeding operations are also necessary to provide resources to officers farther from R&R sites or on moving duties such as attending to demonstrators or parade routes during their shifts. Below are some useful strategies for providing event nourishment as it relates to R&R sites, mobile deliveries, per diems, and weather:

#### **BEST PRACTICE**

Prepare for mobile delivery operations of food for officers who cannot get to fixed R&R sites.

- **R&R sites:** Plan for multiple R&R sites, taking into consideration officer assignments and posts to avoid having officers travel far distances for nourishment. R&R sites should be quality locations—where there is adequate space, restrooms, and heating/cooling—that are open whenever officers are on duty. Planners can set up sites that are specifically assigned to officers' posts and should ensure that each site has an appropriate amount of resources. Additionally, consider mobile R&R vehicles, such as buses, if there are not available fixed-site R&R locations close to where a large number of officers will be posted.
- **Mobile deliveries:** Prepare for mobile delivery operations using utility terrain vehicles (UTVs) to provide nourishment to officers that cannot leave post or for those with immediate resource requests like water or medications. This consideration should be planned for in the event of a large-scale demonstration where officers cannot leave their posts and must be fed and hydrated in the street.
- **Per diem:** Work with federal grant managers to determine if per diem can be given to officers in remote locations and for sources or plainclothes officers to minimize the scale of the feeding operations and ensure the protection of sources and plainclothes officers.
- **Weather:** If there are concerns with extreme heat or cold, set up cooling or heating stations at R&R sites, as well as at heavily-trafficked checkpoints, where officers will be on duty for long hours of the day.
- **Food Vendors:** Hire multiple outside vendors to feed personnel. Multiple vendors can be chosen to ensure that spoiled food from one vendor does not make the entire workforce sick, offer multiple options to officers with dietary restrictions, and to spread the return of funds to the local economy.

## ● *Coordinate Lodging for Officers*

All out-of-area officers who are not currently working or living within driving distance of the event will require lodging. The scope of this task

### **BEST PRACTICE**

During the 2016 RNC, officers were housed at one of three universities based on their responsibilities and accessibility to transportation. Motorcycle officers were housed at the university furthest from the RNC because they had their own transportation.

will depend on the number of local hotels, universities, or other lodging accommodations available. In order to efficiently coordinate housing assignments, contact participating agencies for information regarding personnel housing needs. Ensure that these agencies provide accurate lists of personnel in a timely fashion and have someone from the logistics team responsible for housing

check in regularly with out-of-area agencies to ensure the lists are accurate and changes are noted. House officers assigned to the same functions/activities within close proximity of one another to aid in coordinating transportation. Intelligence sources should be provided with secure housing facilities separate from other officers to ensure that their covers are protected. Planners should also work closely with Officer Transportation personnel when coordinating these assignments to house officers with their own transportation further and to house officers at universities with transportation and escorts to facilitate movement.

If applicable, confer with the host/event committee, or the group responsible for reserving rooms for event delegates and VIPs early on. This will allow law enforcement to gauge the availability of hotels that can be used for officers. Ensure that funding or federal approval is acquired early in order to reserve blocks of hotel rooms and secure low rates. If funding or approval is not available, hotels may not set aside rooms for officers and could open them up to the public. It is important that law enforcement communicate and work with federal funders (and the SAA, if applicable) early to begin necessary approval processes. In the event that insufficient lodging is available, look to use alternate mass housing options, such as local universities.

Before reserving any lodging facility, conduct site visits to facilities to inspect accommodations and avoid any health and comfort concerns such as pests, and functioning room amenities. Visit the secured lodging facilities just prior to the beginning of the event to ensure cleanliness and appropriate facilities for public safety personnel. For example, prior to the 2016 RNC, the Cleveland Division of Police worked with the colleges and universities housing officers to decorate the dormitories to look more welcoming and comfortable. In addition, health department experts should be placed on standby during the event to respond quickly to any health concerns.

Ensure that visiting officers are properly checked-in and checked-out. Identify local volunteers or officers and supervisors—who are familiar with the area and can welcome officers on behalf of the host city and agency—to perform this function. These local individuals should be provided with brief training regarding their exact roles and responsibilities.

Consider hiring an event planner or trusted travel agency to coordinate large housing needs in an effort to free time and resources of law enforcement officers for other security-related tasks. If applicable, be mindful of any federal grant requirements and guidelines for hiring an outside firm—such as the possibility of greater costs and the potential for complications with locked

contracts that include not being able to cancel or change reservations. With increased scrutiny around event planning in federal grants, the costs of hiring an event planner may not be reimbursable and this activity should be discussed with the federal funding agency (and the SAA, if applicable).

### ● *Arrange for Officer Transportation*

Officer transportation consists of the movement of all officers in and around the secure and non-secure zones of an event, as well as to and from lodging and assignments. Proper coordination of officer transportation is critical for ensuring that officers are on time for their assignments and can return to their lodging locations to rest after long shifts. The following are some useful strategies for creating officer transportation plans and coordinating movement for officers:

- **Officer transportation plans:** Determine the basics of your officer transportation plan as early as possible, including whether or not you will use an outside contractor, school district resources, or other methods of transportation. If you are using an outside vendor transportation providers will be a highly-sought-after resource and waiting too long may affect the quality of the company you receive. These companies may be used to transport officers assisting in the event and local law enforcement should work closely with vendors in developing transportation plans and protocols. Additionally, ensure that transportation plans and contingencies align with officers' schedules. Allot time to ensure that drivers fully understand the transportation plan and can identify the equipment and training necessary to implement the detailed provisions. Transportation providers may wish to purchase equipment such as GPS and radios to ensure drivers are able to maintain transport schedules and routes and constant contact with someone in one of the operations centers. The plan should:
  - Allow agencies to bring their own patrol cars if there is adequate parking, to alleviate the scope of officer transport;
  - Locate officers that cannot self-transport centrally, near mass transit options, and locate officers that can self-transport in surrounding hotels; and
  - Identify back-up transportation options for maximum flexibility.
- **Officer movement:** Assign local officers to help with officer transportation, since they are familiar with navigating the area. Assign a commander in the field to quickly respond to transportation needs. Provide visiting officers clear instructions of transportation plans and procedures including pick-up/drop-off locations and times prior to the event.
- **Officer pick-up:** Coordinate officer pick-up at a final duty station, rather than where a shift began, to eliminate the need for officers to return to the initial drop-off point.
- **Using Buses:** When/If acquiring buses to transport officers, ensure that sufficient vehicles are obtained to meet duty schedules and transportation distances to officer lodging. Buses should have the capacity to adequately accommodate officers' equipment and gear.

#### **BEST PRACTICE**

Allow agencies to bring their own patrol cars to minimize the number of officers who require transportation assistance. When possible, identify options in advance for parking these vehicles as staging areas will likely be limited during a large-scale event.

## Toolkit References


The following resources (found in Appendix A) can be used for planning and operations of administrative and logistics support:

- A.4 Logistics Information Survey, Page A-13
- A.5 Food Vendor Information Sheet, Page A-15
- A.6 Inspection Checklist for Vendors, Page A-19
- A.7 Hotel Survey Questionnaire, Page A-23

## 3.2 Command and Control

Law enforcement responds to a wide range of security incidents and operations that are typically handled by a single unit or department. A large-scale security event will require a different approach and a different command structure.

DHS provides consistent national guidance to local, state, and federal government agencies for approaching incident management of domestic events.<sup>16</sup> This standard approach—including the National Incident Management System (NIMS) and the Incident Command System (ICS)—provides a core set of doctrine, principles, terminology, and organizational processes that enable efficient, flexible, and collaborative incident management at all levels. Since large-scale security events involve the collaboration of multiple jurisdictions, NIMS and ICS provide an effective standard for coordination.

Command and Control - Planning Checklist		
	Key Steps	Completed 
●	Establish a Command Structure with Appropriate Leadership	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Develop a Professional Relationship with Agency Leaders	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Coordinate Response through a Unified Operations Center	<input type="checkbox"/>
▲	Coordinate Response with the MACC	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Maintain Situational Awareness	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Keep Open Lines of Communication	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Structure Operations Similar to Traditional Patrol Operations	<input type="checkbox"/>
KEY: ● Large-Scale Security Events and NSSEs ▲ NSSEs		

### ● *Establish a Command Structure with Appropriate Leadership*

Appoint an Incident Commander or Director to oversee operations early in the planning stages. Overarching leadership is important for ensuring that the major security functions are well-coordinated and managed. Commanders should have a clear understanding of their roles and responsibilities during both the planning and operations phases.

<sup>16</sup> This guidance was mandated as part of Homeland Security Presidential Directive-5.

### ● *Develop a Professional Relationship with Agency Leaders*

During the planning phase, build professional relationships with leaders from outside local, state, and federal agencies involved in security operations.<sup>17</sup> If you are the lead agency, acknowledge that despite the ability to handle a large-scale event without assistance of others, collaborating and being inclusive are important to help accomplish your mission, and determine which agencies can provide the most assistance in achieving those goals.<sup>18</sup>

Arrange monthly informal gatherings—such as breakfasts, lunches, coffee, etc.—with relevant local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies—such as USSS, FBI, DHS, Air Force, U.S. Marshals, etc.—to assist in developing valuable working relationships. Conducting and documenting these meetings is invaluable in maintaining productive relationships especially as the event nears and planning intensifies.

### ● *Coordinate Response through a Unified Operations Center*

If the event involves VIPs, demonstrators, and/or other stakeholders, local law enforcement should activate its command center. In many cases, this may start a few days before the actual event occurs, to ensure that any potential challenges are worked out before the actual event.

### ▲ *Coordinate Response with the Multi-Agency Command Center (MACC)*

For NSSEs, event security is monitored by USSS through a MACC. The MACC is generally activated in a safe location, sometimes outside of the host city. Several agencies, including local, state, and federal agencies, are represented at the MACC to promote integrated communication and coordination, as well as enhanced situational awareness.

If local law enforcement has a close relationship with USSS and there is adequate space, local law enforcement operations can be coordinated together at the MACC. Otherwise local operations can be coordinated at a separate location, such as the department's Command Center. Local law enforcement can be deployed to the MACC to facilitate coordination of police responses with the USSS.

### ● *Maintain Situational Awareness*

During multi-day events, operations command centers should conduct shift briefings and develop and share situational reports to ensure that all key stakeholders maintain situational awareness. During the 2016 DNC, agency liaisons in the Philadelphia Emergency Operations Center (EOC) conducted regular “spot reports” to share important updates from their agency and to quickly identify solutions to any challenges. Executives should also maintain awareness through regular briefings with decision-makers from the mayor's office, police department, fire department, transportation services, solid waste services, public affairs, and the event committee. These

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<sup>17</sup> Braziel, Rick, Frank Straub, George Watson, and Rod Hoops. 2016. Bringing Calm to Chaos: A Critical Incident Review of the San Bernardino Public Safety Response to the December 2, 2015, Terrorist Shooting Incident at the Inland Regional Center. Critical Response Initiative. Washington, DC: Office of Community Oriented Policing Services. <https://www.policefoundation.org/publication/bringing-calm-to-chaos-a-police-foundation-review-of-the-san-bernardino-terrorist-attacks/>.

<sup>18</sup> Police Under Attack: Southern California Law Enforcement Response to the Attacks by Christopher Dorner (Washington, DC: Police Foundation, 2013), <http://www.policefoundation.org/critical-incident-reviewlibrary/police-foundation-regional-review-of-police-response-to-the-attacks-by-christopher-dorner/>.

meetings should review operations from the previous day and expected activities and challenges for the upcoming day.

#### **BEST PRACTICE**

During the 2016 DNC, agency liaisons in the Philadelphia Emergency Operations Center (EOC) conducted regular “spot reports”—in addition to sharing information through event-management software and regular briefings between agency executives—to share important updates from their agency and to quickly identify solutions to any challenges.

Deploying all uniformed officers with body-worn cameras (BWCs) can provide a multitude of perspectives from multiple areas around the event and help determine if additional resources are needed during a large gathering or demonstration.<sup>19</sup> Especially with new technology that allows for BWC footage to be live-streamed to an agency’s headquarters—along with cameras from dashboards; surveillance systems; smartphones; and helicopters, unmanned aerial systems (UASs), and

other aircrafts—this could provide real-time citywide situational awareness for law enforcement executives and other important decision-makers. Pictures and videos gathered from social media can also enhance situational awareness. It is also important to remember the important situational awareness provided by personnel—both in uniform and undercover—in the field. Information from the field shared with incident commanders who are not in the field, allows them to make timely and well-informed response decisions.

In addition, interagency partners can use event-management software, such as Knowledge Center, to maintain instant situational awareness and share information. These systems can provide officers and security personnel with a comprehensive format for viewing planned activities, tracking incidents, coordinating responses, and managing personnel and resources. Data recorders can be placed in established command and operations centers to record information related to the event in the software. Prior to the event, planners should consider how network firewalls may limit access for interagency users and field personnel and what levels of access different agencies should have.

#### ● *Keep Open Lines of Communication*

Communication and information sharing are extremely important to ensuring effective command and control. Commanders in operations centers must communicate changes in response plans effectively and in a timely manner to commanders in the field. Communication can be achieved using various technologies—such as smartphones, radios, or email—depending on the level of encryption needed. Radio channels are often used to facilitate communication for various security operations such as a transportation talk group or a mobile field force talk group. Commanders also can set up an “executive” talk group to promote open communication without congested radio traffic and unwanted interference.

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<sup>19</sup> Prior to leveraging BWCs in any capacity, jurisdictions should ensure that they have the proper policies and procedures in place and that they have conducted ample trainings on how/when BWCs should be used, relevant issues to their use in maintaining situational awareness, including fully understanding the differences between First Amendment-protected behaviors and suspicious activities. BJA provides a variety of valuable resources for law enforcement using BWCs. The toolkit can be found at <https://www.bja.gov/bwc/topics-gettingstarted.html>.



### **BEST PRACTICE**


Educate security personnel on proper communication protocols and reporting structures to avoid communication choke-points and oversaturation.

Due to the nature of large-scale events, consider establishing encrypted channels to ensure secure communications. Available technologies can be used to prevent individuals from scanning radio channels.

Brief all officers on communication protocols prior to the event to ensure that officers understand who they should be reporting to, how, and when. Unclear and/or mixed communication flows can overburden the Incident Commander, can result in miscommunication and confusion, or can compromise event security. For example, visiting officers may resort to reporting to their own agency's commander, who may then directly contact the Incident Commander, as opposed to reporting in accordance with their proper chain-of-command.

### ● *Structure Operations Similar to Traditional Patrol Operations*

Host departments can encourage seamless command and control with outside agencies by keeping out-of-town personnel from the same agency on the same squad and shift, and mirroring operations after typical law enforcement patrol structures, in which various levels of command facilitate coordinated communications. For example, the first level of operations can consist of a squad of nine patrol officers and one supervisor at the level of sergeant or above. The next layer can be a grouping of five to six squads into platoons, again with a local department executive overseeing each squad and platoon. The final layer of command and control can include functional group commanders, to which platoon leaders report, and should be an executive-level decision-maker (Figure 2 below). Establishing a command and control structure that is familiar to officers from outside agencies enables clear communication of activities and the direct supervision and reporting of issues throughout the event.



### **Toolkit References**

The following template and checklist (found in Appendix A) can be used for planning and operations of command and control:

- A.8 Incident Organization Chart Template, Page A-31
- A.9 Organization Assignment List, Page A-33

In addition, the following are references that other agencies and organizations have developed that contain useful information for planning command and control:

- DHS, *National Incident Management System*, December 2008.
- DHS/FEMA guidance on NIMS/ICS: [www.fema.gov/national-incident-management-system](http://www.fema.gov/national-incident-management-system).

### 3.3 Credentialing

Credentialing is critical because it allows event planners and law enforcement to control the number of people attending the event; regulate access levels; and ensure that those who are being screened at checkpoints are who they claim to be.

Credentialing - Planning Checklist		
	Key Steps	Completed <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
▲	Abide by USSS Credentialing Protocols	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Determine the Type and Level of Credentials Required	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Determine if Vehicle Credentials are Needed	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Detail Credential Specifications	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Provide Specific Guidance to Individuals Requesting Credentials	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Process Credential Information in an Organized and Timely Fashion	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Develop Protocols for Creating and Distributing Credentials	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Ensure that Officers Understand Credential Protocols	<input type="checkbox"/>
<b>KEY:</b> ● Large-Scale Security Events and NSSEs ▲ NSSEs		

#### ▲ *Abide by USSS Credentialing Protocols*

For an NSSE, the USSS will create federal credentials for access to high-security areas that will require background checks or investigations. Early in the planning process, work with USSS to submit names of local agency and/or city officials in order to control access to specific city locations or delineate security zone access and work with the host organization to address additional credentials or whether they will accept USSS credentials.

#### ● *Determine the Type and Level of Credentials Required*

The type and level of credentials required will vary depending on the event and the individual's roles and responsibilities. For an NSSE, the local agency may choose not to issue additional credentials. However, officers that will be involved in facilitating the movement of dignitaries should be included in the credentialing discussion. For non-NSSEs, the local agency might decide to provide one type of credential identifying all officers as local law enforcement and tier the access level according to an officer's role and responsibilities during the event. For example, a command officer might require access to various secure locations during the event, whereas an officer directing traffic might not. Local law enforcement may also choose to issue different types of credentials to improve their ability to manage outside persons such as city personnel or vendors that may require access to secure zones, but are not performing in a safety role.



When establishing the type and level of credentials, planners should determine if background checks will be required, and if so, who will conduct them. If the departments or agencies do not have the capacity to coordinate credentials and background checks, they can consider hiring a private-sector company to assist.

#### **BEST PRACTICE**

Limit physical access to the event by issuing credentials to essential personnel only.

In order to develop credentials in a timely manner and prevent production of unnecessary credentials, local law enforcement executives should determine who will require what type of credential and should attempt to standardize the credential specifications.

Since credentials outside of those created by the USSS are the responsibility of the host law enforcement agency, outside law enforcement agencies should be encouraged to only request credentials for those who will be participating directly in the event, and not complete staffing rosters. Having an abundance of extra credentials is a security risk and should be avoided.

#### ● *Determine if Vehicle Credentials are Needed*

Credentials can also be required for vehicles accessing secure zones or for parking in event areas, to show that a vehicle has been searched and/or where parking is limited. Vehicle credentials (placards) should be issued using vehicle information in order to prevent individuals from sharing credentials. Credentials can also be created for specific venues or events to create security measures in addition to perimeter checkpoints.

#### ● *Detail Credential Specifications*

Include—and attempt to standardize—the following specifications to ensure proper verification and to prevent counterfeiting:

- Photo identification;
- Personal information; and,
- Color-coding or details regarding the individual's level of access or role such as law enforcement personnel, event staff, or VIP. This strategy allows event security the ability to determine agency or venue access by first sight as opposed to a more in-depth inspection.

Choose the approach most suited to the operational environment early.

#### ● *Provide Specific Guidance to Individuals Requesting Credentials*

Clearly communicate cut-off dates and timelines for submitting credentialing information to all participating organizations. At a minimum, require that commanders and supervisors playing a leadership role during the event submit their credential information well in advance of the event date. Be prepared for any last minute personnel changes.

Instructions on requesting credentials should alert agencies of specific information requirements. Describe what personnel photographs should look like, including the dimensions of the photograph, appropriate attire such as hats and glasses not being

#### **BEST PRACTICE**

Provide specific instructions on the information required to receive credentials to avoid unnecessary delays in processing access requests.

allowed in photographs, and describe the approval processes. The host agency should also provide examples of photographs to alleviate having to request new pictures.

● *Process Credential Information in an Organized and Timely Fashion*

The local jurisdiction may receive thousands of requests for credentials. To expedite the credentialing process, develop a system or database—or use a pre-existing one—to securely process personnel information and photographs and to track all required information. Additionally, ensure that necessary vehicles have the proper placards as early as possible. In addition, anticipate the need for last-minute production of new, corrected, or lost/forgotten credentials by establishing an adequately staffed and equipped on-site credentialing location near event venues and lodging sites.

● *Develop Protocols for Creating and Distributing Credentials*

Have a plan for receiving and distributing local, state, and federal credentials that ensures these materials are always in the custody of authorized personnel, whether they are delivered directly to support agencies or picked up in-person. If credentials are picked up in person, designate a single location that is open before and during the event to prevent uncertainty of where credentials should be obtained.

**BEST PRACTICE**

Determine protocols and authorities for tracking and distributing credentials to ensure that they are not distributed to unauthorized personnel.

● *Ensure that Officers Understand Credential Protocols*

Personnel staffing security checkpoints must know the credentialing protocols to prevent secure zones from being compromised. All security staff should be briefed on the appearance of credentials and their associated access requirements. Establish and publicize a single point of contact—including phone number or email address—to event attendees and security personnel for answering questions regarding credentials.

**Toolkit References**


The following checklist (found in Appendix A) can be used for planning and operations for credentialing:

- A.10 Credentialing Checklist, Page A-35

**3.4 Crowd Management**

Large-scale security events often attract large groups of demonstrators underscoring law enforcement’s public safety role.

Crowd management planning must take into account all elements of an event, especially the type and duration, venue characteristics, methods of entrance, likely attendees, the size and demeanor of the crowds, communication mechanisms, crowd control strategies, and queuing practices.

Crowd Management - Planning Checklist		
	Key Steps	Completed 
●	Anticipate Crowd Behaviors and Actions	<input type="checkbox"/>

Crowd Management - Planning Checklist		
	Key Steps	Completed <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
●	Collaborate with Other Organizations	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Use Data to Support the Development of Crowd Management Deployment	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Develop a Policing Strategy that is Focused on Non-Confrontational Tactics Centered on Team Policing	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Identify the Most Appropriate Resources for the Mission	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Determine Officer Dress	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Manage Demonstrator Activities	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Train Officers on the Policing Strategy	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Inform the Public of Response Tactics	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Create Mobile Response Teams	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Position Commanders in the Field	<input type="checkbox"/>
<b>KEY:</b> ● Large-Scale Security Events and NSSEs ▲ NSSEs		

### ● *Anticipate Crowd Behaviors and Actions*

Prior to the event, understand the nature of the audience attracted by a particular event. Engage with representatives from those groups most likely to attend and layout rules of engagement, share concerns, share safety and security plans, and establish working relationships with these various groups. As part of these relationships, determine expected demonstration groups, including their size, typical behaviors, and any adversary groups. Collaboratively identify potential behaviors and actions that crowd members may be planning to take—such as demonstrations, marches, protests, and getting arrested—and work with them to ensure the events remain peaceful. Additionally, work with faith and other community leaders to gather information on local gangs and other deviant groups that may pose a threat to the overall security of the event. Common demonstrator tactics that police should be aware of include the following:<sup>20</sup>

#### **BEST PRACTICE**

Engage with representatives from those groups most likely to attend and layout rules of engagement, share concerns, share safety and security plans, and establish working relationships with these various groups. As part of these relationships, determine expected demonstration groups, including their size, typical behaviors, and any adversary groups.

- Blocking roads, streets, and intersections;
- Heaving rocks, sticks, and other projectiles;
- Wearing masks or other protective equipment to block effects from chemical irritants;
- Spitting or yelling in police officers' faces; or
- Breaking windows or vandalizing property.

Separate intelligence gathering, counter-terrorism, and counter-surveillance activities from proactive engagement. While both aspects can provide important awareness of what to expect, it is important that community members and demonstrators don't feel that they are being co-opted

<sup>20</sup> A more extensive list of protestor tactics can be found in the DOJ Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, *Planning and Managing Security for Major Special Events: Guidelines for Law Enforcement*, 2007.

or used. Information on demonstrators is primarily obtained through criminal intelligence gathering, which is detailed in Section 3.8 – Intelligence/Counter-terrorism/Counter Surveillance.

### ● *Collaborate with Other Organizations*

A number of local, state, and federal organizations, such as the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and the DOJ Community Relations Service (CRS), specialize in interactions with demonstrators and may be able to provide advice and negotiate in advance of any demonstrations. CRS is a third-party conciliation agency that specializes in resolving racial and ethnic conflict. CRS personnel often attend large-scale security events and can help resolve disputes arising from alleged use of excessive force by police. Begin collaboration with these types of agencies during the planning phase.

#### **BEST PRACTICE**

Allow demonstrators to set up camp in designated areas, which may provide opportunities for improved engagement and awareness.

### ● *Use Data to Support the Development of Crowd Management Deployment*

Strategic analysis can be done prior to the event to determine where crowd management officers and assets should be deployed. For example, for the 2012 RNC, TPD conducted a geospatial analysis of the arrests that occurred in St. Paul, MN for the 2008 RNC and overlaid that data in the event space for Tampa. Because of this analysis, the department was able to make informed, data-driven decisions of where potential hotspots for arrests may occur and staged their resources appropriately.

### ● *Develop a Policing Strategy Focused on Non-Confrontational Tactics and Team Policing*

Most demonstrators tend to be peaceful and simply want media attention drawn to their causes. As a result, crowd control strategies should focus on non-aggressive policing tactics that not only protect civil rights and First Amendment rights to free speech and peaceful assembly, but also encourages open communication between the police and the public.

Focus policing strategies on the importance of working as a team when responding to large crowds/demonstrators and to prioritizing engagement and de-escalation. Working as a team will provide a unified front for local law enforcement's public safety plans and protocols and prevent crowds from targeting individual officers. Especially given the attention focused on law enforcement's response to large gatherings, mass demonstrations, and other critical incidents it is imperative to remind officers that "to be successful, dialogue will depend not only on what police do, but also on what they are seen to do, both by their peers as well as those within the crowd."

#### **BEST PRACTICE**

Stress team policing tactics and impress upon officers that their mission is to protect the Constitutional rights of all of the event attendees. Emphasize the importance of the First

Amendment<sup>21</sup> and abiding by the department's use of force policy by handing them out and displaying them prominently in check-in, lodging, and R&R sites.

Though non-aggressive strategies are recommended for crowd control tactics, law enforcement must also be prepared to respond to criminal behaviors. Protocols on what types of behaviors will not be tolerated and appropriate uses of force should be detailed in operational plans and trained on repeatedly. Instilling the department's philosophy on use of force can be a challenge since these events may require bringing in officers from outside agencies with different use of force policies. Ensure that all outside officers are thoroughly trained on the selected use of force policies for the event and are reminded of the policies at each roll call.<sup>22</sup>

### ● *Identify the Most Appropriate Resources for Crowd Management*

A variety of vehicles can be used as part of non-confrontational crowd control tactics, including bicycles, dual sport motorcycles,<sup>23</sup> or UTVs. Such vehicles are valuable because they can be used as physical barriers for managing crowd movement and can allow police to rapidly respond to crowd control incidents. Dual sport motorcycles are useful for patrolling the larger outer perimeter of an event, as they do not fatigue officers like bicycles do. Additionally, bicycle officers tend to be seen by attendees as more approachable and friendlier and they are able to make rounds on a regular basis to ensure safety and security of all. Bicycle Unit officers were also able to provide slightly more mobility than officers on foot, allowing officers to provide assistance during movement of parades and marches. In these regards, the Bicycle Unit was extremely positive and appreciated by demonstrators. When needed, bicycles can also serve as physical barricades for directing large crowds.

It is also important to note, that while planners may consider the use of mounted officers for crowd control, they should understand the advantages and disadvantages of these resources. The use of horses can be inefficient and costly and not as useful as bicycles based on cost, maintenance, and speed.

#### **BEST PRACTICE**

Use bicycles and dual-sport vehicles to create force flexibility and as a non-confrontational crowd management tactic.

### ● *Determine Officer Dress*

Officer dress can impact public perceptions and actions. For example, officers in full riot gear may encourage demonstrators to be more aggressive, while officers in regular duty uniforms may de-escalate demonstrators and appear more welcoming. Determine if a common uniform or an officer's regular duty uniform should be used. A common uniform can be valuable in providing a unified front for crowd control operations. Conversely, the local agency can allow visiting officers to wear their department's uniform, which can be a cost-effective approach to showing a wide-range of force.

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<sup>21</sup> The BJA National Criminal Intelligence Resource Center provides *Responding to First Amendment-Protected Events—The Role of State and Local Law Enforcement Officers* online training videos and resources at no-cost, available at: [https://www.ncirc.gov/Training\\_First\\_Amendment.aspx](https://www.ncirc.gov/Training_First_Amendment.aspx). These trainings should be required for all officers.

<sup>22</sup> Criminal Intelligence Coordinating Council, *Recommendations for First Amendment-Protected Events for State and Local Law Enforcement Agencies*, Bureau of Justice Assistance (2012). <https://www.it.ojp.gov/GIST/35/Recommendations-for-First-Amendment-Protected-Events-for-State-and-Local-Law-Enforcement-Agencies> (accessed February 3, 2017).

<sup>23</sup> Dual sport motorcycles are 400 cc on/off road motorcycles.

During both the 2016 RNC in Cleveland and the 2016 DNC in Philadelphia, crowd management officers that were visible to attendees and demonstrators were dressed in regular duty uniforms, while crowd management officers nearby—but out of sight—were dressed in full riot gear with helmets, shields, and chemical irritants. These individuals were not deployed at either location.

### ● *Manage Demonstrator Activities*

Consider the following strategies for controlling demonstrator activities during a large-scale security event:

- Pre-designate parade and march routes to better manage traffic interruptions of planned demonstrations;
- Prior to the event, scan the area to remove objects that could be thrown at officers or used to damage property;
- Pre-position officers out of sight in hatch/riot gear;
- Designate space for demonstrators to sleep and set up their base of operations to consolidate demonstrators to one location and allow police to maintain better awareness of demonstrator activities; and,
- Evaluate the need for and layout of a free speech platform.

### ● *Train Officers on the Policing Strategy*

Critical to the success of crowd management operations is effectively training all officers—not just field officers assigned to crowd management—in predetermined policing strategies and the overall mission, vision, and goals. Include information on expected response tactics—including de-escalation and respect for First Amendment rights—and unacceptable behaviors in training. Specifically, train officers to use behaviors and tactics that allow demonstrators to exercise their Constitutional rights, as well as encourage officers to engage in friendly interactions with attendees. Moreover, reinforce department policies on use of force and how an adverse reaction or lapse in judgment may lead to an overall negative public perception of the department.

#### **BEST PRACTICE**

Reinforce appropriate police responses by educating officers of actions they should not participate in.

#### **BEST PRACTICE**

TPD executed a highly effective training strategy for the 2012 RNC entitled “Don’t be that guy.” This training reinforced enforcement actions through videos and pictures of officers using poor decision-making skills, conducting themselves in an inappropriate manner, and using excessive force.

Offer trainings at multiple times and through multiple mechanisms to ensure that all officers receive and understand the department’s protocols and expectations for crowd management. Trainings should be spread across multiple platforms including: online, classroom and scenario-based tabletop exercises, and in-person drills.

Scenario training and exercises and drills can prepare officers to remain unresponsive to demonstrators that try to bait and elicit negative responses. Online trainings can also ease the burden on providing out-of-town officers before they get on-site and help reinforce the local laws and policies and procedures. Examples for delivering training include presentations, webinars, online course curriculum, or in-person training at an academy. Lesson and instructional training can also include specific scenarios and exercises that resemble actual or probable events. To



highlight the importance of this training, consider having the Chief or Sheriff provide a direct message that reinforces the department’s crowd management primary mission and tactics.

### ● *Inform the Public of Response Tactics*

Conduct a public awareness campaign that includes the overall goals, crowd management strategies, and use of force protocols that law enforcement will be using for the event, so that the public is properly informed of expected actions. This campaign should educate demonstrators and the public on law enforcement’s primary crowd management objective: maintaining professional interactions and a balance between protecting demonstrators’ rights and public safety.

The campaign should consist of meetings with protestor groups and civil rights organizations ahead of the event to discuss primary objectives and resolve public concerns. Town hall meetings should also be facilitated by leaders of the city to inform the public and community members on what to expect prior to and during the event (see Section 3.14 – Public Information and Media Relations for details on how to communicate effectively with the public).

### ● *Create Mobile Response Teams*

The use of Mobile Field Force (MFF) teams can be effective for crowd management responses, as they are dedicated forces assigned to responding to incidents immediately. These teams should be trained specifically to quickly remove agitators and law breakers before they can incite the crowd.

### ● *Position Commanders in the Field*

Position executives and leaders in the field during the event. Walking through and engaging demonstrators, showing support to line officers, communicating with residents, and generally being present is beneficial to all parties. For public safety officers, commanders in the field can assess a situation first-hand and determine the best tactics to deploy and response decisions can be communicated to field forces faster, diffusing the potential escalation of disruptive behavior. For demonstrators and attendees, commanders in the field serve as authority figures to engage with and report issues to. If possible, field commanders should also be issued designated golf carts or dual-sport vehicles to quickly navigate secure zones.

### **BEST PRACTICE**

Throughout the 2016 RNC process, CPD Chief Williams and Cassandra Bledsoe—the Chief’s Community Liaison—engaged religious leaders, the Peacemakers’ Alliance, business owners, and community members—to address community violence issues and community concerns about march/parade routes, traffic issues and general law enforcement issues. CPD also emphasized the important role that these groups would play during the RNC. He gained their support—including as community volunteers—during the Convention. CPD also collaborated with local universities that agreed to house out-of-town officers before and during the event. During the RNC, Chief Williams could be seen walking through the demonstration crowds, engaging with demonstrators, personally de-escalating potentially contentious situations, and speaking with the media regularly.

### *Toolkit References*

The following resource (found in Appendix A) can be used for crowd management planning and operations:

- A.11 Considerations for Managing Crowds, Page A-39

### 3.5 Dignitary/VIP Protection

Dignitaries and VIPs require security protection, as they can be targets for harmful or criminal attacks. Dignitaries are categorized as, “any person that has a law enforcement protective detail as directed by state or federal statute,” such as current or former U.S. Presidents, state governors, foreign heads of state, or Senate/House leadership posts. A VIP is, “any person who has limited protection or is being granted special access privileges,” such as U.S. senators, U.S. Congress people, city mayors, diplomatic corps, or famous individuals such as actors or athletes.<sup>24</sup>

For NSSEs, the USSS is responsible for the protection of White House personnel. Local law enforcement will primarily be responsible for assisting in all non-USSS protection details participating in the event, which includes coordinating the use of multi-agency assets to assist dignitary/VIP transportation, access to event venues, credentialing, communications, special event coverage and hotel security.<sup>25</sup> If Congressional leaders will be attending, local law enforcement should engage the U.S. Capitol Police to understand and account for their requirements as soon as possible.

Dignitary/VIP Protection - Planning Checklist		
	Key Steps	Completed <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
●	Determine Who Needs Protection	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Determine Your Protection Strategy	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Acquire and Train Officers	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Develop an Operational Plan for VIP Protection	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Minimize Officer Fatigue	<input type="checkbox"/>
<b>KEY:</b> ● Large-Scale Security Events and NSSEs ▲ NSSEs		

#### ● *Determine Who Needs Protection*

Identify which dignitaries and VIPs will require protection, what level of protection they will need, and if there are individuals who will not be provided local officer protection. Reach out to protectee staff prior to the event to directly obtain sensitive information regarding a protectee’s anticipated movements and activities. Direct contact between local law enforcement and protectee staff removes additional layers of information-transfer through agencies and can speed up the VIP protection-planning process.

#### ● *Determine Your Protection Strategy*

Choose a strategy for organizing and conducting protective details – the “jump teams” approach or the “wheels-up to wheels-down” approach.

- **“Jump teams” approach:** This approach assigns officers to quick-response teams that provide security as needed to VIPs, for

#### **BEST PRACTICE**

Assign officers to each protectee to provide effective communication and situational awareness of all VIP activities.

<sup>24</sup> 2012 RNC Dignitary/VIP Subcommittee, *Executive Steering Committee Brief*, January 11, 2012.

<sup>25</sup> Some dignitaries and VIPs may provide their own bodyguards, details, and protection.



example, during the event while attending a meeting or party or while transporting in a motorcade. This approach permits response flexibility and is more accommodating if few personnel/resources are available.

- **“Wheels-up to wheels-down” approach:** This approach assigns an officer to each VIP requiring protection, allowing commanders to communicate and maintain situational awareness of all VIP activities/issues.

### ● *Acquire and Train Officers*

Ensure that adequate police personnel are available to provide security, which will require cooperation with other police, fire, and sheriffs’ departments, as well as coordination with other event-planning subcommittees (e.g. Venue, Delegate Buses, Transportation, Officer Lodging/Transportation, and Credentialing subcommittees).

#### **BEST PRACTICE**

Acquire and train all security personnel prior to the event, including private security and/or personal security guards.

It is critical that all personnel resources, including reserve or light-duty officers, are identified and accounted for prior to the event. Train and brief each officer on expectations, standards, and the professionalism and fluidity required of them. Briefs

should include logistics and details of the operational plan for providing protection to important personnel (e.g., shifts, communication protocols, transportation routes, and credentialing procedures). Equally important are briefs on relevant security information to private security and personal bodyguards.

### ● *Develop an Operational Plan for VIP Protection*

Cover the following key elements in the operational plan for VIP protection:

#### **BEST PRACTICE**

Include pre-defined routes and parking information for protective details in transportation plans.

- **Access:** Include information on arrival and departure locations and site-security plans.
- **Transportation:** Cover logistics of protective motorcades, tail and lead vehicles, or drivers. Plans should include pre-defined routes and parking that protective details will use and should consider coordinating protective details’ transportation movements with that of pedestrian sidewalk traffic.
- **Contingency routes:** Include back-up routes in anticipation of traffic problems.
- **Communication:** Detail dispatch centers, email groups, or radio coverage mechanisms.
- **Credentialing:** Explain coordination with the credential subcommittee, as well as credential requirements and formats for dignitaries and VIPs, the process to obtain request for credentials, and the distribution process of credentials.
- **Site coverage:** Describe the usage of law enforcement officers at key event venues that dignitaries and VIPs will be attending.
- **Training:** Detail pre-event training on operational plans, transportation routes, and emergency evacuation/medical procedures.

### ● *Minimize Officer Fatigue*

Protective detail officers will probably be tired from long shifts hours, due to getting up early for vehicle sweeps and staying out late at special events. Minimize officer fatigue by strategically pairing officers' behaviors with those of VIPs. For example, match officers' early-morning or late-night behaviors with those behaviors of VIPs. In addition, reduce long hours by locating officers' lodging accommodations near, or in, their protective details' hotels.

In addition, keep in mind that law enforcement officers on protective details must follow the movement of their protectees and may not be able to go to designated R&R sites for food. Thus, local law enforcement should consider providing adequate food options such as per diem or access to multiple R&R sites so officers are properly nourished.<sup>26</sup>


### *Toolkit References*

The following template (found in Appendix A) can be used for dignitary/VIP protection:

- A.3 Operational Plan Template, Page A-11

## 3.6 Financial Management

Financial management is critical for the effective execution and accountability of a large-scale security event. Specifically for NSSEs, jurisdictions should understand any requirements and expectations that accompany the receipt of federal funds.<sup>27</sup> It is important to understand the potential amount of planning and preparatory costs prior to applying to host an NSSE, as some early pre-event planning costs will arise in advance of the grant-funding approval and will remain solely in the responsibility of the jurisdiction. A jurisdiction must keep in mind that the grant process for these kinds of large-scale awards is often a lengthy one. In addition, expenses incurred prior to the appropriation of federal funds for this purpose will likely not be reimbursable.

Financial Management - Planning Checklist		
	Key Steps	Completed 
●	Develop a Comprehensive and Detailed Budget	<input type="checkbox"/>
▲	Understand How NSSEs may be Financed	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Engage the State Administering Agency (SAA) for State-wide Resources as Needed	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Maintain Open Lines of Communication with Financial Stakeholders	<input type="checkbox"/>
▲	Prepare for Federal Site Visits and Post-event Audits	<input type="checkbox"/>
<b>KEY:</b> ● Large-Scale Security Events and NSSEs ▲ NSSEs		

<sup>26</sup> Also discussed in Section 3.1 – Administrative and Logistics Support.

<sup>27</sup> Not all large-scale security events receive federal funding; in these instances, local jurisdictions operate with finances similar to those set aside for daily operations. The information provided in this section is applicable to those events where federal funding is received.

### ● *Develop a Comprehensive and Detailed Budget*

Create a comprehensive budget that outlines and breaks down every potential cost—including personnel and overtime, equipment and technology, liability insurance, lodging and food, etc.—to successfully and safely host the event. Accuracy and detail are paramount to this process in order to avoid any unexpected costs or last-minute purchases, and to prepare for potential city and federal audits immediately following the event. In cases of an NSSE, follow the established budget categories outlined in the DOJ Grants Financial Guide<sup>28</sup> in order to assist the federal agency in an expedited review.

### ▲ *Understand How NSSEs may be Financed*

Local jurisdictions will incur certain costs for NSSE designated events. Congress may appropriate funds for an NSSE event through BJA, U.S. Department of Defense, and/or DHS to reimburse security costs incurred by a host jurisdiction. Wherever possible, jurisdictions should look to leverage existing grant and local funds for these events. Additionally, all personnel from the lead local jurisdiction—as well as anyone involved in developing a proposal to host a large-scale event—should complete the DOJ Online Grants Financial Management Training.<sup>29</sup> Executives must be cognizant of funding procedures, special conditions, and guidelines for reimbursable costs. Especially when federal funding is being used, it is imperative to read, understand, and abide by all of the special conditions attached to the award and to have the necessary documentation and receipts accounted for during monitoring visits or audits. In addition, accurately building a precise budget breakdown early in planning and having all procurement requests go through one agency, or the core planning team, may help to avoid the absorption of unallowable costs later on.

Please see the Appendix A.12—*BJA Special Event Funding Guidance*—for information on the use of federal funding, including financial guidance on pre-event planning, the application period, the award period, closing the award, and a sample timeline of key activities.

### ● *Engage the State Administering Agency (SAA) for State-wide Resources as Needed*

For NSSEs, local liaisons should work regularly with the State Administering Agency (SAA) and federal funding authorities to properly communicate specific resources and funding needs. Since SAAs have long-standing relationships with federal funding agencies, agency liaisons can work with the SAA to become familiar with financial processes and protocols to ensure that they are compliant with grant guidelines and requirements when procuring equipment or making logistics purchases. They may also assist with Mutual Aid Agreements for officers outside of the city or state where the NSSE is held. Knowledge of these guidelines is critical to avoiding financial impacts and obstacles during and after the event, when all financial expenses are closely audited.

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<sup>28</sup> U.S. Department of Justice. “DOJ Grants Financial Guide.” 2015.  
<https://www.justice.gov/ovw/file/892031/download>.

<sup>29</sup> This training, provided by OJP at no cost, is available at: <https://ojpfgm.webfirst.com/mod/page/view.php?id=1>.

## ● *Maintain Open Lines of Communication with Financial Stakeholders*

### **BEST PRACTICE**

Keep open lines of communication with financial stakeholders to ensure accurate financial reporting in accordance with contractual requirements.

Convene appropriate key personnel early at all levels, including local, state, and federal, to discuss and determine the financial scope of the event and all expected costs. Discussions can address how to expedite timelines for receiving federal funds, streamlining the process for receiving approvals to

purchase equipment, and purchasing equipment as early as possible to prevent additional costs.

Additionally, these discussions can include descriptions of what policies, procedures, and functions must be in place prior to receiving approval to purchase certain items and what the review process will entail. Regardless, dedicate personnel to act as a point of contact with the city or federal agency. Ensure that this point of contact conducts regular conference calls or in-person meetings throughout the process to communicate any issues or changes in the projected budget. Plan to work with the BJA team on pre-approval before draw down of funds and justification and approval for equipment lists.

## ▲ *Prepare for Federal Site Visits and Post-Event Audits*

With federal funding, expect the federal agency and/or its oversight offices as well as other oversight bodies to conduct site visits and

audits prior to and after the event. These visits will include a thorough review of all expenses

### **BEST PRACTICE**

Keep detailed records of purchases and expenses in preparation for a post-event financial audit.

incurred with grant funds and serve to ensure that grant funds were managed properly. To effectively prepare for post-event audits:

- Ensure that all administrative, financial, managerial and related operational personnel participate in Office of the Inspector General (OIG) fraud-prevention training.
- Share fraud-prevention information to all host site personnel that have the potential to be involved in acquiring safety and security materials and services. It is important that all those involved understand what grant and/or procurement fraud is and the consequences for intentionally or unintentionally committing fraud.
- The host jurisdiction or state must keep a record of every transaction throughout the grant program. Collect necessary documentation for fiscal audits as they come in and take pictures of equipment purchased with federal funds as they are deployed to help justify their use.

## *Toolkit References*

The following guides (found in Appendix A) can be used for financial and grant management planning and operations:

- A.12 Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) Special Event Funding Guidance, Page A-47
- A.13 Financial Provisions and Policies, Page A-51
- A.14 Post-award Requirements: Grant Fraud, Waste, and Abuse, Page A-55

Additional resources on financial planning and grant management include:

- The OJP Procurement Procedures for Recipients of DOJ Grants

Post-award Instructions for Office of the Chief Financial Officer grant recipients and sub recipients

([http://www.ojp.gov/financialguide/PDFs/New%20Procurement%20Guide\\_508compliant.pdf](http://www.ojp.gov/financialguide/PDFs/New%20Procurement%20Guide_508compliant.pdf)).

- DOJ Financial Guide
- Federal government regulation information: <http://www.regulations.gov>
- Grants Management System (GMS) Training and Technical Assistance: <http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/training/gmstraining.htm>
- The Federal Funding Accountability and Transparency Act (FFATA) Sub-award Reporting System (FSRS): <https://www.fsr.gov>

### 3.7 Fire/Emergency Medical Services/Hospitals/Public Health

Public health and medical support focus primarily on preventing, minimizing, and quickly responding to injury or health issues. Fire departments, Emergency Medical Services (EMS), and medical care are primarily responsible for supporting this public health operation during large-scale security events and law enforcement officers can assist when needed. Likewise, fire, EMS, and medical care agencies can also assist law enforcement by providing situational awareness information and ensuring officer wellness.

Fire/Emergency Medical Services/Hospitals/Public Health - Planning Checklist		
	Key Steps	Completed <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
●	Obtain Necessary Personnel	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Outline Operational Activities in Response Plans	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Collaborate During Steady-State Operations to Prepare for a Health Event Response	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Coordinate Joint Responses to Encourage Situational Awareness	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Train Medical Response Personnel	<input type="checkbox"/>
<b>KEY:</b> ● Large-Scale Security Events and NSSEs ▲ NSSEs		

#### ● *Obtain Necessary Personnel*

Ensure there are enough personnel to support the public health operation during the event without detracting from the services being provided to the rest of the city. If necessary, request mutual aid and leverage EMAC for fire/EMS services as well. Their schedules should align as closely as possible with those of the lead local law enforcement agency to ensure collaboration and assistance is available as needed. Additionally, pre-shift briefings can occur together, ensuring all first responders are aware of pertinent issues.

## ● *Outline Operational Activities in Response Plans*

Document the following information for public health and medical operations into the operational plans:<sup>30</sup>

### **Fire/EMS**

- Command, control, and coordination structures;
- Pre-hospital/field emergency locations such as mobile field hospitals and protocols;
- Resources, equipment, and personnel for fire, medical, and mobile response teams;
- Logistics deployment and requirements;
- Transportation protocols and traffic routes for emergency vehicles on the ground and in the air—patient evacuation;
- Staging information for fire trucks, ambulances, and other emergency vehicles;
- Protocols for National Disaster Medical Assistance Teams or other strike team assistance including Urban Search and Rescue or Aeromedical Response Teams;
- Transitions to consequence management, if required including staging and dispensing of antibiotics or considerations for mass casualties; and,
- Having equipment available for mass evacuations and heavy equipment on standby to move debris and other large items, in the event of a natural or man-made disaster.

### **Hospital**

- Methodologies for tracking patients and conducting surveillance of health incidents;
- Communication protocols, tools, and systems;
- Integration with local primary and secondary response hospitals; and
- Medical measures for prisoner and detention-related activities.

### **Public Health**

- Food security and safety;
- Disease-prevention strategies;
- Plans for protecting the local public health and medical infrastructure; and
- Decontamination measures.

## ● *Collaborate During Steady-State Operations to Prepare for a Health Event Response*

### **BEST PRACTICE**

Promote interagency collaboration to help ensure a city-wide common operating picture is maintained.

The local fire department and EMS agency will have lead authority in the planning and operations of fire and medical coverage. Regional public safety partners—including fire, EMS, emergency management, public health, and law

enforcement—should plan end exercise unified command and cooperative response to complex

### **BEST PRACTICE**

Consider how weather will affect the operational activities and how Fire/EMS and other City agencies can proactively address and prevent issues. During the 2016 DNC in Philadelphia, the city provided pallets of water bottles, water misters, and an air conditioned tent for demonstrators because of the extreme heat. There was also a severe thunderstorm in which police and Fire/EMS helped protect demonstrators that were camping at FDR Park.

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<sup>30</sup> More detailed discussions of fire and EMS planning and response activities can be found in DHS/FEMA's *Special Events Contingency Planning: Job Aids Manual*, March 2005.



incidents regularly.<sup>31</sup> Among relevant agencies, identify required and available resources based on joint threat and vulnerability assessments.

### ● *Coordinate Joint Responses to Encourage Situational Awareness*

Create a Joint Medical Operations Center (JMOC) to serve as a central coordination unit that will oversee triage stations, state hospitals, field hospitals, and mobile medical units. The JMOC should be staffed with all health and medical assets, including public health, mass casualty, animal health, and agriculture.

Develop situation reports and conduct daily briefings to ensure that everyone is aware of fire/EMS/hospitals/public health incidents and response actions.

### ● *Train Medical Response Personnel*

Train all local medical response personnel, as well as federal strike assistance teams, in the fire/EMS/hospital/public health plans, protocols, and communication mechanisms. This training reinforces communication channels among response personnel and maintains a safe public health and medical environment.

### *Toolkit References*

The following checklist (found in Appendix A) can be used for Fire/EMS/Hospitals/Public Health Services planning and operations:

- A.15 EMS Venue Assessment Checklist, Page A-59

## **3.8 Intelligence/Counter-terrorism/Counter Surveillance**

Intelligence operations for local police departments are often conducted by internal criminal intelligence units. To better support intelligence operations—including obtaining, assessing, and disseminating information about potential threats of all types—departments should complement their intelligence unit with information and intelligence from regional, state or local fusion centers, and contact federal agencies for assistance.

For larger events, especially NSSEs that have national priorities and high-level security implications, the FBI is the lead federal agency for intelligence, specifically terrorism-related issues. Local law enforcement is responsible for intelligence gathering as it relates to anarchist, demonstrator groups, and other criminal activity not related to terrorism. During NSSEs, federal partners have event security plans that can activate many intelligence operational centers, such as the Protective Intelligence Coordinating Center, the FBI Intelligence Operations Center, and the MACC; intelligence teams, such as USSS Protective Intelligence Teams (a.k.a. “ID Teams”) and FBI Intelligence Teams (a.k.a. “I” Teams).<sup>32</sup>

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<sup>31</sup> Braziel, Rick, Frank Straub, George Watson, and Rod Hoops. 2016. Bringing Calm to Chaos: A Critical Incident Review of the San Bernardino Public Safety Response to the December 2, 2015, Terrorist Shooting Incident at the Inland Regional Center. Critical Response Initiative. Washington, DC: Office of Community Oriented Policing Services.

<sup>32</sup> 2012 Republican National Convention Subcommittee, *Final Plan of Operation Intelligence Subcommittee (DRAFT)*, May 2012.

Intelligence/Counter-terrorism/Counter Surveillance - Planning Checklist		
	Key Steps	Completed <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
●	Conduct Threat and Risk Assessments	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Develop an Operational Plan for Intelligence	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Collaborate with Field Operations	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Leverage Technologies to Provide Real-Time Information	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Conduct Traditional and Non-Traditional Crime Analysis	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Use Intelligence Sources with Mobile Technologies	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Strategically Integrate Intelligence Sources	<input type="checkbox"/>
<b>KEY:</b> ● Large-Scale Security Events and NSSEs ▲ NSSEs		

### ● *Conduct Threat and Risk Assessments*

Collaborate with the FBI to identify potential threats from outside the jurisdiction. Local law enforcement should work closely with intelligence counterparts to ensure accurate threat information is obtained. Prior to the event, local, state, and federal intelligence agencies should be actively monitoring and tracking anticipated demonstrators and security threats, while also being respectful of First Amendment rights and protected activities. Local officers can work with faith and other community leaders to gather information on local gangs and other groups that may pose a threat to the overall security of the event and identify potential behaviors and actions that local demonstrators may be planning to take—such as marches, protests, and getting arrested. Threat and risk assessment is valuable to determine vulnerabilities and the resources required for intelligence operations. Focus threat assessments on the following four key elements:<sup>33</sup>

- **Threat inventory:** Determine groups or individuals that may pose a threat to the event.
- **Threat assessment:** Determine the level of threat for each threat identified in threat inventory.
- **Target assessment:** Determine probable targets and locations in the jurisdiction that criminals may attempt to disrupt.
- **Target vulnerability:** Determine how vulnerable each target is for an attack.

### ● *Develop an Intelligence Operational Plan*

An intelligence operational plan should include the following elements:

- **Mission and goals:** Describe the purpose of the intelligence unit and what type of threats it will be trying to deter.
- **Event details and participating agencies:** Include information on the execution of the event and the roles and authorities of various agencies.

<sup>33</sup> Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, *Law Enforcement Intelligence: A Guide for State, Local, and Tribal Law Enforcement Agencies*, November 2004.



- **Command and operations centers:** Include information on staffing, hours of operation, and reporting protocols.
- **Other operational elements:** Include specifics on field teams, intelligence sources, communication mechanisms and protocols, critical incident response protocols, air space or waterway restrictions, and pre-event intelligence.

### ● *Collaborate with Field Operations*

Local law enforcement coordination of intelligence can be enhanced by conducting joint operations between intelligence and field officers. Collaboration can improve field commanders' awareness and knowledge of key players causing disruption, allowing for strategic arrests and deterrence of criminal behavior.

### ● *Leverage Technologies to Provide Real-Time Information*

Leveraging technologies including body-worn cameras (BWCs)—along with cameras from dashboards; surveillance and CCTV camera systems; smartphones; and helicopters, unmanned aerial systems (UASs), and other aircrafts—

#### **BEST PRACTICE**

Leveraging multiple technologies and platforms can help with real-time information sharing and decision-making.

information gathered from social media; and other technologies to provide real-time information. BWCs can provide a multitude of perspectives from multiple areas around the event and help determine if additional resources are needed during a large gathering or demonstration.

Especially with new technology that allows for BWC footage to be live-streamed to an agency's headquarters, this could provide real-time information.

In addition, interagency partners can use event-management software to collect and share information. These systems can provide officers and security personnel with a comprehensive format for viewing planned activities, tracking incidents, coordinating responses, and managing personnel and resources. Data recorders can be placed in established command and operations centers to record information related to the event in the software.

After appropriate technology is selected, make sure that all event personnel are trained on how to use it. In addition, tests and exercises should be conducted to validate that technologies are operational. Finally, establish back-up plans, such as replacement technologies or technicians on standby to fix broken equipment, in the case that technologies fail during the event.

### ● *Conduct Traditional and Non-Traditional Crime Analysis*

#### **BEST PRACTICE**

Supplement traditional crime analysis tools with other technologies, such as monitoring cellphone networks or social media.

Traditional crime analysis activities can bolster the effectiveness of information collected from various technologies. For example, police departments can conduct commonly-used analysis strategies to identify threats and use

technologies to monitor calls for service; use license plate readers to identify suspicious vehicles; and, search faces of suspicious persons on intelligence databases/watch lists such as the National Crime Information Center, local police department command center, and NSSE watch lists.

Additionally, agencies can use more novel crime-intelligence strategies—such as monitoring social media sites like Facebook, Twitter, and Vine, or cellular network technologies—to

compile and disseminate useful security information. Agencies can even use geofencing technology to create a perimeter around the event to determine which social media posts are more worthy of investigation than others.

● *Use Intelligence Sources with Mobile Technologies*

Deploy intelligence sources and intelligence officers to gather real-time intelligence on identified suspicious persons or activities, intent, tactics, and challenges. Intelligence sources can use text messages and smartphones to communicate intelligence to command staff for operational responses. Consider using mobile technologies that also allow intelligence sources to send photos and videos and allow commanders to track their locations. Intelligence sources can also receive covert responses from their command post through text messages.

● *Strategically Integrate Intelligence Sources*

Integrate intelligence sources with demonstrator groups in a multi-tiered system in case officers are discovered. In addition, a number of measures should be conducted to limit a source’s interactions with law enforcement, including briefing them off-site, giving them per diems for meals, and locating them at a separate R&R site.<sup>34</sup> An easy-to-identify system must be developed for interactions between intelligence sources and regular law enforcement to ensure that they can identify themselves without compromising their cover. If practical, this system should not be obvious and used as needed as not to give away other covert sources.


**Toolkit References**

The following checklist (found in Appendix A) can be used for planning and operations for intelligence/counter-terrorism/counter surveillance activities:

- A.16 Intelligence/Counter Surveillance Planning and Operations Checklist, Page A-61

**3.9 Interagency Communications and Technology**

Security personnel and partner agencies must be able to communicate with their own staff and among one other to obtain a proper understanding of the nature and scope of response operations. Hosting a large-scale event is an opportunity to upgrade and integrate public sector communications technology to ensure that all these agencies can communicate seamlessly when needed. To further facilitate interagency communication, establish partnerships and hold regular meetings or conference calls early on in the planning process.

Interagency Communications and Technology - Planning Checklist		
	Key Steps	Completed 
●	Develop an Operational Plan for Interagency Communications	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Identify Communication Technologies	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Test Communication Mechanisms	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Establish a Coordinated Communications Center	<input type="checkbox"/>

<sup>34</sup> Also discussed in Section 3.1 Administrative and Logistics Support.

Interagency Communications and Technology - Planning Checklist		
	Key Steps	Completed <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
●	Create Communication Strike Teams	<input type="checkbox"/>
<b>KEY:</b> ● Large-Scale Security Events and NSSEs ▲ NSSEs		

### ● *Develop an Operational Plan for Interagency Communications*

A comprehensive communications plan should provide streamlined communication for both field operations and interagency coordination. Separate event-related communications from regular city communications such as 9-1-1 calls, so that event personnel can differentiate between the two.

Detail the following information in the communications plan:

- **Mechanisms:** For field operations, the use of radio talk groups (channels) can reduce radio congestion and ensure that radio communications cannot be scanned by non-law enforcement officials.
- **Equipment:** Radios are the most common form of communication equipment for law enforcement agencies, but the use of smartphones by law enforcement is also increasingly more popular than radios because of the ability to text multiple numbers and share information and images/videos at the same time. When using radios, interoperability between various agencies and their dispatch centers needs to be evaluated on both encrypted and non-encrypted channels. When using smartphones, be cognizant of who you are texting and how the phone is being used. Include distribution and demobilization plans, as well as a tracking system, for planned equipment.
- **Communication protocols:** Brief personnel on proper protocols for communications and clearly explain it to all officers and personnel prior to the event, to avoid uncertainty of how radio channels operate, whom to report to, and assign call signs and terminologies.
- **Dispatchers:** Assign sufficient personnel to manage calls through radios and ensure that they are equipped with proper information. For example, during the 2012 RNC, Tampa Police Communications Center had its own internal Wiki that was used extensively by dispatchers. Rosters, phone numbers, radio numbers, schedules, event information and much more were programmed into the Wiki site, which enabled the dispatchers to quickly access information within seconds.
- **Contingencies:** Plans should include redundancies such as back-up radio networks, dispatchers, or radio talk groups in case primary mechanisms lose signal or battery life, slow down because of data usage, or become overloaded. Other useful contingency strategies include having full contact information of officer radio assignments should officers need to be contacted for technical difficulties.

### ● *Identify Communication Technologies*

Focus communications plans primarily on technologies available for maintaining situational awareness throughout the event. Technologies can include radios, smartphones, mobile data terminals (MDTs) and tablets, email, mass email services, or texting services, or web-based event/incident management software systems. It is important that agencies determine if

technologies are interoperable to freely allow field units and participating agencies to communicate in real time, regardless of different equipment or frequencies.

### ● *Test Communication Mechanisms*

Brief all personnel on the use of various technologies and then conduct tests and exercises, prior to the event, to ensure that systems are functional and that personnel know how to effectively operate them. These tests should also include simulations in system slowdowns or entire shutdowns during an event and require the use of alternative strategies and protocols.<sup>35</sup> The lead local jurisdiction may also want to consider coordinating these tests with vendors present to identify and address potential issues that may arise.

### ● *Establish a Coordinated Communications Center*

Communication operations and responses should be well-coordinated among partners during the event. A coordinated communications center—at a Command Center or a dedicated location—with representatives from each major agency can ensure that information flows are streamlined and open. Staff this communication center with appropriate personnel from the police department, fire department, and emergency services. By having all stakeholders in the same room, personnel will be able to maintain situational awareness of the entire communications operation.

#### **BEST PRACTICE**

During the 2016 DNC, Philadelphia had a liaison from each of the relevant stakeholders in the Emergency Operations Center (EOC). All of the PIOs from these agencies also had their own Joint Information Center (JIC) where they ensured coordination throughout the process, while still allowing individual agencies to control their own message and delivery.

### ● *Create Communication Strike Teams*

Systems or technologies can fail during a large-scale security event. For example, it is common for officers in the field to have issues with broken radios or need back-up batteries due to their long shift hours. To properly prepare and quickly respond to communication failures, create communication strike teams who can be quickly called upon to resolve technical problems.

#### **BEST PRACTICE**

Create communication strike teams to quickly respond to technical issues that could potentially stall safety operations.

### *Toolkit References*

The following form (found in Appendix A) can be used for planning and operations for interagency communications and technology:

- A.17 Incident Radio Communications Plan Form, Page A-63

## 3.10 Legal Affairs

The complexity of security for large events means that there may be legal issues to address before, during, and particularly after the event. Law enforcement should pay close attention to

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<sup>35</sup> Braziel, Rick, Frank Straub, George Watson, and Rod Hoops. 2016. Bringing Calm to Chaos: A Critical Incident Review of the San Bernardino Public Safety Response to the December 2, 2015, Terrorist Shooting Incident at the Inland Regional Center. Critical Response Initiative. Washington, DC: Office of Community Oriented Policing Services.

legal issues related to public disclosure and to minimizing risk for civil liberties litigation. It may also be worthwhile to have an attorney assigned to command personnel, station attorneys in the field where there is the highest likelihood of demonstrations or other events that could lead to lawsuits, and in the EOC where they can provide real-time recommendations and information. A major challenge for law enforcement is minimizing the risks of lawsuits when responding to demonstrations, engaging in use of force, and making arrests. For example, during arrests, it is important that officers who are making arrests understand how to articulate reasons for arrest to the Assistant District Attorney, so that the charge isn't declined before going to court.<sup>36</sup>

Legal Affairs - Planning Checklist		
	Key Steps	Completed <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
●	Include Law Experts in Early Planning	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Ensure that Plans are Constitutionally Sound	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Prepare and Thoroughly Review Contracts	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Identify Strategies to Mitigate Litigation Risk	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Ensure Outside Officers have Legal Jurisdiction	<input type="checkbox"/>
<b>KEY:</b> ● Large-Scale Security Events and NSSEs ▲ NSSEs		

### ● *Include Law Experts in Early Planning*

Early coordinated planning, collaboration, and involvement of attorneys is critical throughout the large-scale event process, particularly with procurement and preventing litigation challenges after an event. Assign law enforcement liaisons to all subcommittees that will require their expertise. The legal subcommittee should consist of law experts from all major planning agencies who can discuss potential legal issues with city officials, civil rights groups like the American Civil Liberties Union, and special interest groups like the National Media Guild. The legal subcommittee should also include city attorneys as part of the procurement process to ensure that things are being ordered according to city rules and according to any regulations and to help write any necessary legal policies and/or procedures needed to be able to order certain equipment. Subcommittee members should clearly define its mission and objectives and meet on a regular basis.

### ● *Ensure that Plans are Constitutionally Sound*

Engage in legal planning specific to the security of the event and work with the internal legal

#### **BEST PRACTICE**

Conduct a legal review of security plans, procedures, and protocols to ensure that tactics are Constitutionally sound.

department and City Attorney's Office to review all security plans, procedures, and protocols on tactics to ensure that they are Constitutionally and legally sound. This will give the host agency

confidence in all aspects of their plan, allowing them to be open and transparent with the media and unions.

<sup>36</sup> Police Executive Research Forum, *Managing Major Events: Best Practices from the Field*, June 2011.

Work with the City Attorney’s Office to draft and pass new rules, policies, or event ordinances specific to improving safety of the event. Policies can detail regulations for prohibited items, police use of force and arrests, and demonstrator activity. Comprehensive policy analysis from other cities that commonly handle large-scale security events can be conducted to determine whether new and/or amended regulations need to be established. New ordinances should be discussed in advance with the media and union groups in order to establish the precedence and general message that the agency has safety measures under control.

For example, if the focus is on minimizing arrests, legal planning should consider ways to assist in reducing the number of arrests. Prior to the 2016 DNC in Philadelphia, the Mayor signed a bill introduced by the City Council to change the crimes generally associated with mass demonstrations—including Disorderly Conduct, Failure to Disperse, Public Drunkenness, and Obstructing the Highway—from criminal summary citations to lesser civil penalties and/or fines.

In addition, ordinances against camping in Franklin Delano Roosevelt (FDR) Park were not enforced the week of the DNC. These policy and ordinance changes exemplified the positive message the City intended to carry out throughout the DNC, and significantly reduced the potential for litigation filed by demonstrators challenging tactics used during arrests. Likewise, in Cleveland during the 2016 RNC, attorneys and risk managers were even included in the EOC during the RNC to provide real-time information and suggestions to officers in the field.

### ● *Prepare and Thoroughly Review Contracts*

Work with city officials to prepare and review the contracts that will be established to obtain necessary goods and services such as hotel accommodations, food, office space, etc. Outside assistance on contract reviews can be provided to law enforcement officers who may not be familiar with contractual procedures and ensuring that contracts meet not only grant, but city legal requirements.

### ● *Identify Strategies to Mitigate Litigation Risk*

Other strategies for mitigating civil litigation include the following:

- Review existing ordinances and laws, and amend or create new laws to ensure the safety of the event;
- Provide officers with specialized training;
- Manage crowds and their activity based on illegal behaviors and the number of resources available;
- Assign City, County, and State’s Attorney representatives to the law enforcement command center to provide guidance on arrest laws;
- Deploy attorneys from the department’s legal department or City Attorney’s Office to the field for demonstrations and arrests;
- Plan ahead for post-event litigations by documenting activities and keeping meticulous records during planning, training, and operations. Record these activities in an after-action report. In addition, consider using body-worn and other on-site camera recordings

#### **BEST PRACTICE**

Have legal representation at the command center to answer questions regarding arresting rights.



for fending off lawsuits or carefully overseeing the collection of public records prior to, during, and after the event; and,

- Videotape all encounters with protestors for future review.

### ● *Ensure Outside Officers have Legal Jurisdiction*

Legal planners are also responsible for ensuring that all officers from outside agencies have legal jurisdiction in the local area. These visiting officers should be covered by a mutual aid agreement that details critical topics such as compensation, insurance, and compliance with grant conditions.

### *Toolkit References*

The following checklist (found in Appendix A) can be used for legal planning and operations:

- A.18 Legal Affairs Checklist, Page A-65
- A.19 2012 Convention Event Ordinances, Page A-67

## 3.11 Non-Event Patrol

During a special event, local law enforcement must maintain its standard daily public safety response requirements for community members in their jurisdiction, and must ensure that they do so in a way that does not significantly impact the areas outside of the event. These agencies must also collaborate with other city agencies to ensure the maintenance of non-security-related essential services and to prepare for emergency relief.

Non-Event Patrol - Planning Checklist		
	Key Steps	Completed <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
●	Maintain Staffing and Resource Levels	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Manage Non-Security Event Responses	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Prepare for Large Emergencies	<input type="checkbox"/>
<b>KEY:</b> ● Large-Scale Security Events and NSSEs ▲ NSSEs		

### ● *Maintain Staffing and Resource Levels*

Maintaining regular patrol operations requires that regular duty assignments remain adequately staffed, sufficient resources are available for normal operations, and regular communication mechanisms are not interrupted. This involves ensuring that all non-event personnel understand the importance of their roles and their contributions to the overall mission and goals of hosting the event. Particularly for officers, explain the potential implications of self-deployment. Additionally, to the extent possible, keep non-event personnel in the jurisdictions/roles they are used to.

#### **BEST PRACTICE**

Ensure that staffing and resources for regular patrol operations are maintained.

However, all non-event patrol should still be educated and trained on event security plans, protocols, and incidents in case they are required to supplement event response. In addition to responding to normal day-to-day operations, non-event patrol officers will likely also support



crowd management units when demonstrations venture into areas outside of the designated march routes. To maintain situational awareness with event incidents, patrol supervisors should provide patrol officers with daily roll calls and briefings between relief shifts. Due to the high potential for non-event patrol officers to come into contact with demonstrators, in each shift briefing, shift commanders should reiterate the department's clear and concise expectation of demonstrator rights and the need for officers to show tolerance and patience.

### ● *Manage Non-Security Event Responses*

In addition to daily law enforcement operations, local emergency management agencies should manage the jurisdiction's emergency operations to coordinate non-security related matters such as water, power, waste management, and bank services, including the potential for natural and man-made emergencies separate from the event. These agencies should also ensure that they maintain regular personnel and resources, either by limiting vacation and extending shift lengths or requesting mutual aid.

### ● *Prepare for Large Emergencies*

Cities often have existing man-made and natural disasters consequence management and emergency operating plans that can be used as a basic response plan during the event. Such plans should be coordinated by the local Emergency Operations Center (EOC). For example, during the 2012 RNC, emergency management agencies and partners supporting the event operated the Consequence Management EOC, which allowed federal, state, and local emergency management agencies and partners to collaborate and communicate effectively and to transition seamlessly into a crisis/consequence management mode in the event of an emergency or disaster incident, like Hurricane Isaac. Although Hurricane Isaac did not directly hit Tampa as was initially tracked, officials activated the EOC and prepared to activate emergency operating plans. Emergency planners should be included in the local EOC early in planning to allow ample time to prepare for the event and coordinate with other agencies. In addition, planners should be located in the EOC or with other local command nodes in the same building including the JMO, the Critical Infrastructure Resource Center (CIRC), or the Interagency Coordination Communication Center (CCC) to allow for a common operating picture.

### *Toolkit References*

The following template (found in Appendix A) can be used for non-event patrol planning and operations:

- A.3 Operational Plan Template, Page A-11

## **3.12 Arrest Processing**

Large events can likely draw demonstrators seeking media attention for their cause by breaking the law and getting arrested, disrupting traffic, and trying to breach venues or the event. However, with the appropriate policies, engagement, and training, large events do not have to involve large numbers of arrests. Regardless, law enforcement personnel should be properly educated to deter arrests, but also prepare them to handle mass arrests in an efficient manner that does not disrupt event activities or escalate unruly behavior and have a processing plan that can be scaled according to need.

Arrest Processing - Planning Checklist		
	Key Steps	Completed <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
●	Focus Strategies on Deterring Arrests	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Develop an Operational Plan for Arrest Processing	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Conduct Pre-Event Exercises and Training	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Conduct Arrests Quickly	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Develop Protocols for Handling Evidence	<input type="checkbox"/>
<b>KEY:</b> ● Large-Scale Security Events and NSSEs ▲ NSSEs		

### ● *Focus Strategies on Deterring Arrests*

While preparations should be made to handle the increased potential for mass arrests, a specialized focus on deterring arrests is also important. City officials can take the lead in deterring arrests by de-criminalizing misdemeanors commonly associated with mass gatherings and demonstrations, allowing camping in public parks where it is traditionally prohibited, and extending liquor licenses of bars and restaurants. Additionally, local law enforcement agencies should work with faith and community leaders to address community violence issues and community concerns and to involve them as volunteers during the event. Law enforcement officers can also identify and implement effective crowd management strategies, such as initiating any responses with bicycle officers and officers in their regular duty uniforms, building cooperative relationships and engaging with demonstrator, and providing officers with MFF training on behaviors to prevent criminal activities. This will allow law enforcement planners to avoid negative media attention and costly litigation (see Section 3.5 – Crowd management for details on MFF training).

Review strategies and plans used by law enforcement departments for managing mass arrests during previous successful large-scale events. Be mindful that typically a small percentage of arrests made are a result of criminal behavior and that arrest numbers are typically driven up by non-criminal demonstrators simply wanting to exercise their freedom of speech. Deterrence strategies should consist of careful analysis of arrest data from previous events, specifically with an assessment of arrests made for unlawful assembly versus criminal behavior. This is valuable for understanding and properly educating arresting officers on the types and scale of arrests that will be directly related to use of force and for developing an appropriate and scalable operational plan.

### ● *Develop an Operational Plan for Arrest Processing*

An effective operational plan should address the potential need to make mass arrests (i.e., personnel for arresting and prosecuting, equipment for arrests, and jail space). Automation of the arrest process needs to be developed at least 10 months prior to the event and should also be part of the testing and exercises. This plan should be developed in coordination with interagency partners and include the following elements:

- **Mission and goals:** Describe the purpose of arrest-processing activities and their importance to event security.

- **Event details and resource/staffing logistics:** Include information about staffing numbers, which individuals do and do not have the authority to make arrests if needed, shifts, prison locations, expected peak and off-peak operation times, and mutual aid agreements or vendor contracts. For staffing, consider authorizing only lead local jurisdiction officers and other in-state officers, to make arrests and for arrest processing to avoid having to bring outside officers back for litigation. Also, consider beginning with a minimal number of personnel and expand as needed.
- **Organizational and command structure:** Provide detailed charts and contact information on responsible authorities, including attorneys that are in the field to provide information.
- **Arresting officer procedures:** Detail officer check-in processes and procedures for receiving equipment, communicating, and obtaining credentials.
- **Operational procedures:** Include specifics on transporting personnel, making on-scene arrests, processing arrestees remotely, transportation and tracking of arrestees, searching of arrestees and their property, receiving and housing, and booking procedures. Include maps of facilities and directions, when appropriate.
- **Contingency plans:** Although alternatives to mass arrests are encouraged, contingency plans should be detailed should such actions become necessary to facilitate the restoration of order.
- **Housing and population assessments and plans:** Include information from assessments, which can include inmate capacities per facility and separation of genders or different age groups.
- **Court procedures:** Describe how follow-up civil processing will occur.

#### BEST PRACTICE

CPD and the Cleveland Division of Corrections (CDOC) created an arrestee processing strategy for the 2016 RNC that focused on maximizing efficiencies for all parties involved. Arrestee processing vans were stationed strategically throughout the RNC area. Upon arrest, an individual would be brought to the nearest van and booked into the system. The individual would then receive a wristband with their personal information and the arresting officer's name and badge number. By capturing that information and putting it on the wristband, officers did not have to be pulled from their assignment in the field and could be followed up with after their shift or when inflammatory situations calmed. Additionally, CDOC moved current prisoners to out-of-town facilities to increase available space for RNC-related arrests.

Once this processing plan is developed, brief and educate all personnel on processing and tracking procedures.

#### ● *Conduct Pre-Event Exercises and Training*

Remind arresting officers of their roles and responsibilities to ensure that they understand how they should act while conducting arrests and processing arrestees and the types of criminal behavior—including damaging property, crossing a police line, and harming others—that will not be tolerated. Combine training with MFF operations so that arrest-processing officers are familiar with field protocols and MFF officers gain a better understanding of how these processes work together. More specifically, arrest-processing officers will gain a better understanding of the philosophy of MFF command staff members and be able to adapt their role to complement this function.

● *Conduct Arrests Quickly*

Any necessary arrests should be conducted peacefully and prioritize quickly removing unruly individuals. During the 2016 RNC and DNC, both host departments immediately transported arrested individuals to off-site locations for processing to effectively diffuse potentially violent situations during arrests. Additionally, event-related arrest plans and procedures may have to be modified and amended in real-time.

**BEST PRACTICE**

During the 2016 RNC, arrested individuals were immediately taken off-site, quickly loaded in vans, and kept until a group of 10 was ready to be transported, to maximize efficiencies.

● *Develop Protocols for Handling Evidence*

During arrests, an individual will often have personal property that needs to be collected as evidence. Develop protocols for processing, handling, and storing evidence, prior to the event, so that during civil proceedings, such property can be easily tracked and obtained. Also, keep in mind that the volume of personal effects that may need to be taken into custody may be large and require additional resources to adequately transport and stow, and then store, these materials.


**Toolkit References**

The following resource (found in Appendix A) can be used for planning and operations for prisoner processing:

- A.20 Considerations for Processing Prisoners, Page A-71

**3.13 Protecting Critical Infrastructure and Utilities**

In collaboration with interagency partners, coordinate security of critical infrastructure and utilities. Critical infrastructure includes: energy systems, pipelines, utilities, waterways, hotels, communication networks, and mass transit systems.

Protecting Critical Infrastructure and Utilities - Planning Checklist		
	Key Steps	Completed 
●	Conduct Infrastructure and Cyber Risk Assessments	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Develop an Operational Plan to Protect Critical Infrastructure	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Request Assistance from the National Guard	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Use Risk Management Software	<input type="checkbox"/>
<b>KEY:</b> ● Large-Scale Security Events and NSSEs ▲ NSSEs		

● *Conduct Infrastructure and Cyber Risk Assessments*

Work with city, county, and state stakeholders to conduct a risk assessment of physical and cyber infrastructure prior to the event. Assessments will help planners determine priority assets that must be secured, as well as the resources required to maintain them during the event. For example, in preparation of the 2012 RNC, TPD, in conjunction with DHS, assessed the risk of over 60 critical sites, such as utilities, waterways, and hotels. To accomplish this, TPD used risk

management software and a survey tool developed for a previous Presidential Nominating Convention.

Conduct cyber risk analysis and modeling to determine vulnerabilities and their potential impacts on physical infrastructure and utilities, regional communication characteristics, and resiliency. Planners can develop and give host site entities a resiliency survey tool to assess their infrastructure and determine their strengths and weaknesses.

### ● *Develop an Operational Plan to Protect Critical Infrastructure*

Develop a critical infrastructure operational plan in coordination with interagency partners and include the following elements:

- **Mission and goals:** Describe the purpose of critical infrastructure protection and its importance to event security.
- **Event details and participating agencies:** Include information on the execution of the event and the roles and authorities of various agencies.
- **Primary/Secondary venues, lifeline utilities, and support facilities:** Include details on their location, significance, normal use, capacities, and contingencies/backups should one of these be impacted.
- **Command and coordination:** Include information on activated command centers, command structures, and communication protocols.
- **Interagency partners:** Agencies like the state National Guard can provide assistance with physical infrastructure. Other agencies, like the U.S. Department of Defense and FBI, can provide assistance with cyber infrastructure.
- **Pre-event, event, and post-event support activities:** Outline major event-related activities, such as performing risk-based surveys or identifying key infrastructure points of contact pre-event, staffing infrastructure-protection desks at integrated command centers during the event, or transitioning back to steady-state operations post-event.
- **Resources and staffing assignments:** Detail staffing plans, schedules, and required equipment for critical infrastructure sites.

### ● *Request Assistance from the National Guard*

Local law enforcement agencies can request assistance from their state's National Guard if they require additional personnel, equipment, or capacities to maintain the security of critical infrastructure sites during the event. National Guard assets can be used to fill resource gaps for providing security at key critical infrastructure sites. National Guard assets can also be used to provide maintenance for fixed infrastructure such as venues, electrical lines, natural gas lines and organic assets such as vehicles and weapons. Having additional trained personnel can provide an added layer of situational awareness and intelligence gathering to help properly allocate response assets. Many National Guard units also have supplemental Reaction Response Teams that can be pre-trained and stationed within an hour's distance to aid in responding to potential. It is important to note during the planning and budgeting process that if the lead local jurisdiction plans on using the National Guard, the jurisdiction must budget funds to reimburse the National Guard for their costs, as with any other partner agency since neither the Department of Defense nor the National Guard Bureau includes large-scale events or NSSes in their standard budgeting

process. Interagency agreements or intrastate funding transfers can be accomplished for reimbursement purposes.

### ● *Coordinate Response Efforts*

Maintaining both infrastructure and utilities throughout an event requires proper coordination. This can be effectively achieved by setting up a non-security critical infrastructure resilience center (CIRC). An established CIRC will also provide additional situational awareness and a more robust common operating picture. City, county, and private-sector representatives from each of the 18 DHS-identified critical infrastructure sectors—including commercial facilities, transportation systems, communications, and information technology should be represented at the CIRC.<sup>37</sup> The CIRC will serve as a single point of contact for information and questions regarding critical infrastructure. A CIRC also allows for additional engagement of representatives from private companies among the same sector to work together with public safety agencies to be involved in the event and identify and solve problems.

### ● *Use Risk Management Software*

Use risk management software to categorize and track incidents according to levels of risk. These software tools can be used by specialized law enforcement units, such as intelligence teams, to track their positions in relation to critical infrastructures. This capability also allows special teams or forces to prioritize suspicious activities that occur near critical infrastructures. If planners decide that a risk management tool is useful for tracking critical infrastructure, they should ensure that all local and out-of-area personnel are trained on how to use it and the protocols for determining the appropriate level of risk when a new incident is submitted.

### *Toolkit References*

The following resource (found in Appendix A) can be used for planning and operations for protecting critical infrastructures and utilities:

- A.2 Hazard Vulnerability Assessment, Page A-7

## **3.14 Public Information and Media Relations**

It is imperative for law enforcement, event leaders, and public information officers to effectively communicate unified and accurate information to both the public and the media in a timely manner. There are two major types of public information related to special events:

- **General event information about the event:** Examples include when the entrance doors or gates are open, when certain performers or activities begin and end, which VIPs are attending, parking locations, etc.
- **Security information:** What items are and are not allowed into the event, how to evacuate in case of emergency, where first aid services are located, etc.<sup>38</sup>


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<sup>37</sup> There are a total of 18 critical infrastructure sectors, identified by the criteria set forth in Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7 (HSPD-7). These include: food and agriculture, defense industrial base, emergency, healthcare and public health, national monuments and icons, banking and finance, water, chemical, commercial facilities, critical manufacturing, dams, emergency services, nuclear reactors/materials/waste, information technology, communications, postal and shipping, transportation systems, and government facilities.

<sup>38</sup> DOJ Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, *Planning and Managing Security for Major Special Events: Guidelines for Law Enforcement*, 2007.



Place special attention on identifying lead authorities and developing an operational plan that details strategies for engaging and coordinating public affairs for the public, demonstrators, and the media.

Public Information and Media Relations - Planning Checklist		
	Key Steps	Completed 
●	Designate Public Information Officers Early in the Planning Phase	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Manage Public Affairs through a Joint Information Center	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Identify Your Audiences	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Develop an Operational Plan for Public Affairs	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Communicate Openly with the Media	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Keep All Stakeholders Informed	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Provide On-site Information	<input type="checkbox"/>
<b>KEY:</b> ● Large-Scale Security Events and NSSEs ▲ NSSEs		

### ● *Designate Public Information Officers Early in the Planning Phase*

Early in planning, the lead agency and the public information/affairs subcommittee should either designate a single point of contact or Public Information Officer (PIO) who will oversee all public affairs matters related to the overall event. The designation of a single authority figure for releasing information can help promote efficiency and uniformity and provide rumor control and corrective messaging. Designating the appropriate person early ensures opportunities for additional training, enhanced coordination between PIOs, and the ability for the PIO to meet with members of the media and potential demonstrator groups long before an event.

### ● *Manage Public Affairs through a Joint Information Center*

Establish an event-based Joint Information Center (JIC) to manage and coordinate public affairs. A JIC is a location where public information officers (PIOs) perform critical emergency information and crisis communications functions. They are primarily responsible for ensuring that local, state, and federal interagency unified messages are disseminated to the media. A jurisdiction may also choose to set up its own local JIC to cover city-specific information needs. A local JIC can be useful in releasing city-wide unified messages that other event entities will not have purview of, such as city or local business services. PIOs from within the city and neighboring localities can be brought in to manage this operation. Local law enforcement and other city partners must be ready to perform the following functions:

- **Maps:** Tracking incidents, traffic, and other information important to the media on a city map.
- **Fact-finding:** Verifying event information/rumors from the media.
- **Status board:** Tracking media-related activities within the JIC.
- **3-1-1:** Answering questions from the community on a public information hotline.
- **Information products:** Developing press releases and information products.



- **Social media:** Watching activity on social networks to identify and address rumors, answer questions, and/or gather information.

When setting up a local JIC, assign single PIOs to particular tasks for the entire event to ensure streamlined operations. Prior to the event, educate PIOs on their responsibilities and communications protocols, and then give them opportunity to participate in field training to improve their understanding of how public information ties into security operations. Each agency in the JIC should have the authority to approve messaging within their agency’s purview, but it is still important to share this information with all other JIC participants before this messaging becomes public, to avoid confusion or contradictions. For example, while PPD was the lead agency during the 2016 DNC, if a reporter called to ask about the number of people arrested at a demonstration, PPD and the District Attorney’s representative coordinated before the release of that information, since that number could be different than the number of individuals actually charged. The local JIC should also work with other public information nodes and interagency partners to coordinate event-related messages.

### ● *Identify Your Audiences*

Identifying the audiences that need to be communicated with before, during, and after the event is critical to ensuring the success of a public communications plan. To do this, each of the PIOs in the JIC should bring a list of their agency’s media contacts and general categories of social media followers—such as researchers, students, public transportation riders, drivers, etc.—to an early planning meeting. Consolidating all of these media points of contact and categories of followers on social media will help the members of the JIC identify who the key audiences are and what information is most important to them. Generally, there will be five critical audiences—media, law enforcement, community members, VIPs, and visitors including attendees and demonstrators.

Once these audiences have been identified, additional focus should be paid to the most effective communication methods to reach each of these audiences and the types of messages that will best resonate with them.

### ● *Develop an Operational Plan for Public Affairs*

Develop a public information operational plan in coordination with local partners including information on the following elements:

- **Mission and goals:** Describe the purpose of public information and media relations and their importance to event security and the objectives of the JIC:
  - **Maintain a common operating picture by sharing information:** JIC shift briefings, Open communication and dialogue, Information tracking – requests, responses, and rumor control;
  - **Provide accurate and timely public information:** Agency pre-approved FAQs and messaging, vetted information from the EOC and or MACC, and one voice policy; and,
  - **Create a public information chain-of-command:** Ensure lead agencies or designees respond to all information requests.

- **Event details and participating agencies:** Include information on the execution of the event and the roles and authorities of various agencies.
- **Information needs of the public:** Detail anticipated information needs, such as traffic plans and road closures, security screening protocols, or prohibited items.
- **Mechanisms for communication:** Describe plans for disseminating information to the public through press briefings, press releases, and/or social media.
- **Strategies for communicating with identified audiences:** Detail activities and various mechanisms that PIOs should engage in to educate, and communicate with, their identified critical audiences. A variety of concepts are listed in Appendix A: 21: “Best Practices for Law Enforcement Public Information Officers,” which can be tailored to different jurisdictions depending on the unique circumstances, geography, and demographics of each venue.

### ● *Communicate Openly with the Media*

Media will be reporting on the event and will be requesting constant information from local public safety officials and PIOs on event security measures, incidents, road closures, and/or traffic detours. Law enforcement representatives can set the media’s expectations regarding the department’s plans and response to the event, releasing critical information, and providing regular updates by holding pre-event meetings with media outlets. It is important to build this rapport and understanding with media outlets prior to the event.<sup>39</sup> Therefore, law enforcement representatives and PIOs should conduct regional meetings to discuss the provision of designated secure areas for media to park satellite trucks and run operations; where they can set up and what access they will be given; when regular updates will be held; and, what the ground rules for attempting to circumvent policies will be. These meetings can also serve as a good platform to maintain some oversight of media operations to ensure that they do not interfere with traffic/event security and demonstrate the police’s attention to media needs.

During the event, PIOs and any other designated points of contact should provide updates to the media through regularly-scheduled press conferences and online. The media will be most interested in details of mass gatherings and demonstrations, any incidents and arrests, and transportation. Regular press conferences also provide public safety leaders the opportunity to share positive stories of their personnel engaging with and helping event attendees or demonstrators and shining a positive light on the jurisdiction.

### ● *Keep All Stakeholders Informed*

Communicate with everyone in the identified audiences equally, providing them regular information before and during the event. Use multiple communication methods and platforms—including press conferences, press releases, interviews with local and national media outlets, social media platforms, and websites—to ensure that all the identified audiences are effectively reached.

#### **BEST PRACTICE**

Use public information campaigns to provide accurate and timely event-related information to the public and the media.

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<sup>39</sup> Braziel, Rick, Devon Bell, and George Watson. 2015. A Heist Gone Bad: A Police Foundation Critical Incident Review of the Stockton Police Response to the Bank of the West Robbery and Hostage-Taking. Police Foundation.

For example, prior to the event, city leaders such as the Mayor and the local Chief of Police should hold town hall meetings to inform community members about march/parade routes, traffic issues, public transportation schedule changes and detours, and general law enforcement and safety concerns. Community meetings should also be held with business owners in areas that will be impacted by transportation and delivery restrictions or may be impacted by security zone perimeters to address what to expect prior to and during the event. These meetings can also be live-streamed and recorded to be posted online, recapped, and shared online so that people unable to attend in person still receive the information.

Additionally, to engage everyone early:

- Develop a website with information regarding business services, transportation, security, lodging, and the event;
- Use multiple social media platforms to release timely and accurate information;
- Create email or mobile phone-notification services for individuals to sign up for to receive alerts, updates, and changes in event plans; and,
- Develop business alerts for local business that will be affected by the event.

Provide regular information updates through the above services, as well as through a public information hotline during the event. These strategies will ensure that the public has ample access to information about the event, which will likely reduce the amount of questions and discourage unwanted rumors. Having someone directly leading the planning efforts who is also accessible to the community will help to build community trust and lessen potential adverse reaction to event operations.

### ● *Provide On-site Information*

Various tactics can be taken in the field to answer inquiries from the media and reduce uncertainty among spectators that can often lead to negative group mentalities. An easily identifiable on-site information center can be set up near event venues to provide attendees with an opportunity to directly receive trustworthy information. These centers can be staffed by knowledgeable civilians from public safety agencies to answer security, medical, or other event-related questions. These staff members can also collect information about the most frequent questions they are asked and any information they receive and share it with the JIC and other relevant centers as part of the information-sharing model. Additionally, mobile PIOs can be established and dispatched—wearing easily identifiable clothing—to provide the public with quick and frequent access to public information. For example, during the 2012 RNC, the CMPD had mobile PIOs with “Public Information Officer” vests.

#### **BEST PRACTICE**

Deploy Public Information Officers in the field to answer questions from the public.

### *Toolkit References*

The following resource (found in Appendix A) can be used for planning and operations related to public information and media relations:

- A.21 Best Practices for Law Enforcement Public Information Officers, Page A-73

### 3.15 Screening and Physical Security

A critical mechanism for law enforcement to maintain control and public safety during a planned event is establishing security perimeters and checkpoints, and providing security for the airspace, the maritime space, and event venues.

Screening and Physical Security - Planning Checklist		
	Key Steps	Completed <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
<b>Security Perimeters and Checkpoints</b>		
●	Determine Secure Zones	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Establish Screening Protocols	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Define Staffing Responsibilities	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Acquire Resources and Equipment for Establishing Perimeters	<input type="checkbox"/>
▲	Collaborate with the USSS for Screening Secure Zones	<input type="checkbox"/>
<b>Airspace Security</b>		
●	Learn Airspace Security Plans and Protocols	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Identify and Work in Partnership with Interagency Stakeholders	<input type="checkbox"/>
▲	Collaborate with the Airspace Operations Center	<input type="checkbox"/>
<b>Airport Security</b>		
●	Develop an Operational Plan for Airport Security	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Establish Traffic Control Strategies	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Communicate with Stakeholders	<input type="checkbox"/>
<b>Maritime Security</b>		
●	Develop an Operational Plan for Maritime Security	<input type="checkbox"/>
<b>Venue Security</b>		
●	Determine Lead Authority	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Engage in Early, Collaborative Planning	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Coordinate Venue Security Officers	<input type="checkbox"/>
<b>KEY:</b> ● Large-Scale Security Events and NSSEs ▲ NSSEs		

#### *Security Perimeters and Checkpoints*

The primary purpose of setting up security perimeters is to ensure the protection of both people and venues. Secure zones also allow law enforcement personnel to control access and to ensure that only appropriately credentialed personnel and patrons are permitted to access controlled areas. Since large-scale events are often attended by dignitaries and VIPs, there are generally added security challenges. Appropriately established, staffed, and controlled access points aid in

ensuring the safety of these high-profile individuals. Effectively establishing security perimeters and checkpoints requires steadfast attention to several key tasks.

### ● *Determine Secure Zones*

Collaborate early with law enforcement and security stakeholders to determine and negotiate secure zones and perimeters. Since these zones directly impact a variety of other security-related activities—such as staffing assignments; parade routes; and locations for demonstrators, the media, and free speech zones—the earlier these decisions are made the earlier subcommittees and public safety leaders can account for them in their decisions. Secure zones are often set up as multiple rings surrounding the main event venue(s). Available guidance suggests planning access control around main venues in terms of three perimeters—outer, middle, and inner—with greater security checkpoints—such as visual identification checks to credential checks to body/vehicle scans and use of bomb sniffing dogs—as one moves closer to the event venue.<sup>40</sup> Depending on the number of key event venues, there may be several areas of a city that require separate perimeters. Be prepared to continuously adjust secure zones due to the high likelihood of last minute changes and issues, including threats to dignitaries, venue relocations, or event time changes. As part of this process, be sure to engage business owners in areas that will be impacted by transportation and delivery restrictions, may be blocked during parades and other demonstrations, or may have to close entirely.

#### **BEST PRACTICE**

Work with security stakeholders to establish security requirements that meet the needs of all entities.

Using risk assessments and event information such as the number of expected attendees and dignitaries, local law enforcement and federal interagency partners can adequately determine the number and corresponding security levels that are necessary for the event and event-related activities. This risk assessment must be conducted as a joint local and federal endeavor to leverage resources and knowledge inherent at both of these jurisdictional levels. This risk assessment should be conducted as early as possible in the planning process, as this information will be used to form key planning assumptions necessary to build the operational security plan. The assessment will also have implications for credentialing, so the lead local law enforcement agency should work in partnership with the USSS and the hosting organization to determine what credentials will be needed for each of the zones. These key planning assumptions include identifying the secure zones, determining equipment needs for access control, and developing personnel estimates for access control.

### ● *Establish Screening Protocols*

To secure each perimeter checkpoint, law enforcement officers will need to screen incoming persons and vehicles. Planners should clearly define the level of screening required at various secure zones and the different screening mechanisms that could be required for event patrons, staff, and media personnel. Decide if protocols for exiting and re-entering checkpoints should be established. Conduct exercises to test and time security check-point inspections to determine what cascading impacts—if any—screening time will have on ancillary operations, such as traffic and transportation plans and routes, once protocols have been established. For example,

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<sup>40</sup> DOJ Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, *Planning and Managing Security for Major Special Events: Guidelines for Law Enforcement*, 2007.

screening times before delegates could get on buses in Philadelphia during the 2016 DNC exacerbated traffic problems in Center City. Likewise, once at the Wells Fargo Center, the decision to only have certain doors unlocked led to long lines outside and health concerns for some delegates as they tried to get on buses after events. A key aspect to screening is identifying the items that will be prohibited—such as weapons, alcohol, bottles, and backpacks. This list of prohibited items and screening protocols should be widely publicized prior to the event and clearly communicated through signage during the event.

### ● *Define Staffing Responsibilities*

Staffing responsibility will vary for events depending on the priority level identified by the lead credentialing entity. All officers assigned to perimeter checkpoints should be fully trained on screening protocols, such as verification of credentials and screening exemptions for clean vehicles, vendors, and/or deliveries. If private security companies or additional reserve or sworn law enforcement personnel are used for screening, provide them with similar training as sworn law enforcement officers on site to provide assistance, as needed. Station local law enforcement or community volunteers—if possible—who are familiar with the area at each checkpoint to provide directions to the right locations, because much of the federal staffing will consist of personnel from outside the jurisdiction. Establishing a local law enforcement presence at these critical interaction points allows for more effective resolutions to issues in accordance to local custom and personality.

### ● *Acquire Resources and Equipment for Establishing Perimeters*

Work closely with federal partners to determine equipment needs and staffing assignments at checkpoints after perimeters have been determined. Equipment needs include scanning technologies, such as magnetometers or x-ray machines, as well as physical barriers in the form of cones, cement barricades, or fences. Garbage trucks, school buses, and other large city and county vehicles can also be used as physical barriers that can be used instead of purchasing fences and jersey barriers. Careful consideration should be made to ensure that physical barriers cannot be moved or trespassed by event patrons. For example, use anti-climb fences with links that are too small for people to insert their fingers through to gain traction. Additionally, during the event, have technicians on standby in case equipment needs to be repaired. Moreover, ensure that these technicians have all necessary security credentials should the need for on-site maintenance be required during the event.

### ▲ *Collaborate with the USSS for Screening Secure Zones*

For NSSEs, the USSS will establish its own security perimeters and main event zones, known as “hard zones.” Though USSS personnel will be responsible for securing these areas, local law enforcement must coordinate with the USSS local security operations outside of the hard zones. In addition, prior to NSSEs the USSS will conduct sweeps of the venues it is responsible for, for explosive and hazardous materials. Once an area is deemed “clean,” the USSS will lock it down, and event security measures are implemented. Local law enforcement should regularly communicate with the USSS to share security sweep plans and protocols in order to promote situational awareness and coordinate all operations personnel. Law enforcement should also work with the USSS during planning to determine when secure zones will be demobilized and become public space.



## ***Airspace Security***

Airspace security focuses on detecting, identifying, assessing, and mitigating airborne threats to the event and its participants. The USSS and Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) will be the primary lead for airspace security, requiring assistance from local law enforcement as needed.

### ● *Learn Airspace Security Plans and Protocols*

Become familiar with event airspace security plans that will outline airspace control measures, restrictions including temporary flight restrictions, detection and monitoring strategies and tactics, operations communications and coordination, and an integrated air defense plan that includes the use of military aviation support. Additionally, event airspace security plans should include the public use of unmanned aircraft systems and law enforcement agencies should become familiar with rules and regulations related to their use of UASs during large-scale events.<sup>41</sup> During the event, identify who will handle dispatch of air missions and resource requests at the event's designated interagency operations center, in the event of overlapping security operations.

### ● *Identify and Work in Partnership with Interagency Stakeholders*

Coordination of airspace plans and operations should include airport police, local law enforcement, and other relevant federal stakeholders—including the U.S. Department of Defense, FAA, and Transportation Security Administration (TSA). Working together to identify and communicate about drones that pose threats to the safety and security of the event, those that are deployed by the media and others in an effort to obtain exclusive footage, and those that unintentionally cross into restricted airspace can contribute significantly to situational awareness and air/event safety.<sup>42</sup>

### ▲ *Collaborate with the Airspace Operations Center*

For NSSEs, federal agencies typically coordinate command and control through an Airspace Operations Center (ASOC). The ASOC is responsible for tracking the status of all aviation missions and coordinating authorized flights in the airspace.

## ***Airport Security***

Airport security includes maintaining on-site physical security at local airports, directing traffic through terminals, and coordinating dignitary and VIP travel plans. Such security focuses on ensuring order, safety, and security of individuals' lives, civil liberties, and property at local airports.

### ● *Develop an Operational Plan for Airport Security*

Prior to the event, local airport officials and law enforcement should work together to create a traffic plan for airports, and include the following:

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<sup>41</sup> Valdovinos, Maria, Specht, James, and Zeunik, Jennifer 2016. Law Enforcement & Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS): Guidelines to Enhance Community Trust. Washington, DC: Office of Community Oriented Policing Services. <https://www.policefoundation.org/publication/community-policing-unmanned-aircraft-systems-uas-guidelines-to-enhance-community-trust/>.

<sup>42</sup> For more information, see the FAA's *Law Enforcement Guidance for Suspected Unauthorized UAS Operations (Version 3)*, visit: [https://www.faa.gov/uas/resources/law\\_enforcement/media/FAA\\_UAS-PO\\_LEA\\_Guidance.pdf](https://www.faa.gov/uas/resources/law_enforcement/media/FAA_UAS-PO_LEA_Guidance.pdf).



- Event resources and staff;
- Anticipated dangers;
- Crowd control protocols;
- Traffic-movement plans;
- Command/control; and,
- Communication/information flows.

In the plan, detail whether additional control measures for airspace security are required—as it relates to passengers, cargo, and general aviation traffic—or if standard procedures are sufficient. For example, address whether Federal Air Marshal Service coverage or Customs and Border Protection passenger screeners need to be increased for the duration of the event. Identifying this need early on—and ensuring that adequate personnel are on hand—will help planners to avoid adverse impacts to other plans such as traffic, transportation, and dignitary protection plans. Avoid deviating from proven and successful traffic control strategies. For example, during the 2012 DNC, the Charlotte Airport Administration had civilians and cones in the road to direct traffic. Due to small terminal frontage space, this caused traffic backups. After recommendation from CMPD, the Airport Administration removed the civilians and cones, reducing the traffic delays for incoming vehicles and allowing traffic to flow without any interruption.

### ● *Establish Traffic Control Strategies*

The influx of people attending a large event will result in airport security having to handle significant increases in travelers. In a large event, such as an NSSE, there is an added component of high-profile persons requiring personal security protection. To effectively control airport traffic, develop strategic traffic plans for roadways and for indoor areas. One strategy to minimize vehicular traffic is to have motorcades staged in nearby lots for transporting dignitaries and VIPs to and from the airports, which will help to alleviate traffic impositions on the general public and event attendees, and will lessen the burdens on those charged with providing dignitary and VIP protection.

Another concern for airport security is heavy crowding inside airports on arrival/departure dates. Be flexible and use creative solutions to make potentially crowded areas more manageable for security. Using flight itineraries of event attendees, planners can estimate the number of travelers by day and develop creative solutions for managing crowds. Work with airlines to allow selected personnel to pre-check bags or work with hotels to allow late check-outs, which will help to prevent personnel from waiting in lobby areas for extended periods of time.

#### **BEST PRACTICE**

Acquire sufficient personnel to coordinate VIP travel, and expect last-minute itinerary changes.

Plan to provide additional resources at airport facilities on heavy arrival and departure days to ensure smooth operation of vehicle and pedestrian through-fares. Consider adding a Special Response Platoon two days prior to, and one day following the event to deal with the high volume of travelers.

### ● *Communicate with Stakeholders*

State and local law enforcement are primarily responsible for airport security, in collaboration with airport police. Proper coordination and a shared communication channel are critical to airport security operations. This system will allow state and local law enforcement to coordinate with, and provide situational updates to, the airport police on the arrival of VIPs and possible protection details as they move throughout the airport.

Conduct daily briefings to coordinate and exchange dignitary/VIP arrival and departure itineraries, manage traffic, and allocate resources in support of these activities. Key personnel should include airport police, the TSA, and state and local law enforcement.

### *Maritime Security*

Event venues located near major bodies of water will require maritime security, including the establishment and enforcement of water security zones, protection of the Maritime Transportation System (MTS) like commercial vessels and MTS facilities, and the maintenance of Maritime Domain Awareness to expeditiously identify potential threats to the event and to MTS. Especially for NSSEs, maritime security will involve working in cooperation with the U.S. Coast Guard, which will establish temporary security zones and safety zones.

Key elements for the operation command of maritime security—which should be detailed in an operational plan for maritime security—include safety of all personnel providing security; effective interagency communications; use and safety of search and rescue assets; tactical control coordinated through a maritime operations center; and personnel behaviors and use of force protocols.

#### **BEST PRACTICE**

Establish common and clear lines of communication for maritime security units, to ensure situational awareness of maritime security threats.

### ● *Develop an Operational Plan for Maritime Security*

Maritime security operational plans should include the following:

- **Command/control structures:** Include event operations/planning/logistics/finance section chiefs, liaisons, protection units, and/or venue branch managers.
- **Weather forecasts/tides/currents:** Provide forecasts and necessary safety information at the beginning of each operational period.
- **Response objectives:** Include information such as providing waterside security of main venues, protecting the MTS, ensuring safety and security, or maintaining Maritime Domain Awareness to identify potential threats to all potential responders at the beginning of each operational period.
- **Status of major maritime infrastructure:** Include information such as whether traffic or transit is allowed for piers, rivers, bridges, or channels.
- **Assignment lists:** Include information on the locations of primary/peak, off-peak, and back-up personnel.
- **Communications plans:** Define radio, phone, and/or pager contact information for interagency personnel both on the water and on land.
- **Medical plans:** Detail contact information for medical aid stations and hospitals.

- **Contingency plans:** Include plans for severe or heavy weather such as storms or hurricanes and ensure that weather plans account for an adequate number of vessels to continuously secure area bridges.
- **Other related plans:** Include information on decontamination, force protection, or demobilization plans.

## *Venue Security*

The mission of venue security is to provide a safe and secure environment for main event venues and for attendees staying in hotels.

### ● *Determine Lead Authority*

Identify the lead authority for various event venues to prevent duplicative planning efforts, and to assess any resource needs. During an NSSE, the USSS is in charge of security at the official venues, while local law enforcement is in charge of event venues that fall outside the secure zone and any venues where unofficial events are taking place such as hotels, restaurants, or meeting spaces. In every case, local law enforcement will be called upon to handle disturbances and make arrests in the secure zone, event venues, and throughout the affected area of the event.

### ● *Engage in Early, Collaborative Planning*

Local law enforcement must participate in early planning, in the form of regular or weekly meetings, with federal partners and outside agencies. Early collaboration will allow the planning subcommittees to establish relationships with key stakeholders. Collaboration should include all appropriate stakeholders—such as the local fire department, department of public works, TSA, U.S. Postal Inspector Service, U.S. Department of Defense, state National Guard, and U.S. Department of State—that have assets and infrastructures related to the security of event venues. Planned activities for venue security should include site vulnerability assessments, emergency preparedness, environmental impacts, and the identification of technical and tactical assets. Determine if security perimeters will be established and how they will be maintained—for example, by requiring physical barriers, detection technologies, and/or vehicle sweeps. Include both emergency evacuation and contingency plans in the event of an emergency or overflow of attendees. All of these planning elements should be detailed in the operational plan, which should include timelines for venue security such as when site visits should be conducted, when secure zones will be swept and cleaned, and the location of temporary vehicle and magnetometer checkpoints.

Conduct site visits and walk-throughs of all event venues in order to plan for daily operations and special circumstances prior to the event.

### ● *Coordinate Venue Security Officers*

Adequately staff critical posts to ensure that law enforcement has oversight of the entire venue and can respond quickly to incidents. Effective strategies for officer assignments may include:

- Placing officers on permanent duty assignments to prevent new officers from having to continuously orient themselves to new venues;
- Assigning local officers to venue security, as they are familiar with the area and can provide directions to outsiders; and,

- Ensuring a sufficient number of personnel to allow for the flexible allocation of resources, especially during VIP visits or during times when potential security problems are anticipated.

### ***Toolkit References***

The following checklists (found in Appendix A) can be used to assess planning and operations of access control:

- A.22 Access Control Planning and Operations Checklist, Page A-81
- A.23 Law Enforcement Venue Assessment Checklist, Page A-83

## **3.16 Tactical Support and Explosive Device Response/Hazardous Materials**

Due to the high-profile nature and mass media attention of large-scale security events, law enforcement must be ready to respond to critical incidents including terrorist threats or attacks. Public safety agencies must be able to respond to, assess, and render safe any hazardous materials, suspicious items and persons, or improvised explosive devices (IEDs) during an event.

Tactical support and explosive device response planning should focus on safeguarding life and property, minimizing panic and disruptions to venues, and restoring situations to normal as soon as possible after an incident. Hazardous threats include explosives, chemicals, biological toxins, radiological sources, “military” chemical weapons, and nuclear devices.<sup>43</sup> Prior to the event, law enforcement should use counter-terrorism intelligence and threat assessments to identify potential and propriety threats for the event.

<b>Tactical Support and Explosive Device Response/Hazardous Materials - Planning Checklist</b>		
	<b>Key Steps</b>	<b>Completed</b> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
●	Combine HAZMAT and Explosive Device Response (EDR) Planning	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Develop an Operational Plan for EDR/HAZMAT	<input type="checkbox"/>
<b>KEY:</b> ● Large-Scale Security Events and NSSEs ▲ NSSEs		

### **● *Combine HAZMAT and EDR Planning***

Collaborate with local partners and with state, regional, and federal agencies to maintain situational awareness of HAZMAT and explosive response actions and protective measures. Agencies should be aware lead federal responsibility for explosives investigations that are terror related fall to the FBI, while non-terror explosives incidents fall to the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF) to investigate. Both agencies provide useful resources to state and local law enforcement for responding to explosives incidents.

<sup>43</sup> DOJ Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, *Planning and Managing Security for Major Special Events: Guidelines for Law Enforcement*, 2007.

## ● *Develop an Operational Plan for EDR/HAZMAT*

HAZMAT and ERD response plans should contain the following elements:

- **Event overview and mission:** Describe the purpose of the event and how HAZMAT operations are important to event security.
- **Primary and secondary venues:** Detail locations of high-risk areas including event venues, large public gathering areas and free speech platforms, hotels, and parking garages.
- **Staffing assignments:** Detail how response teams will be staffed and when they will be operational.
- **Communication protocols:** Describe how interagency teams will communicate with one another, and with other intelligence and event-related centers, and if they will need encrypted channels. Also define common HAZMAT terminology as it relates to the event, including differentiating between the terms “suspicious,” “unattended,” “bomb,” and “incendiary device.” Establish one center number for the All Hazards Desk to receive calls and other reports.
- **Execution protocols:** Include information on how local, state, and federal partners will respond to incidents. Determine if different procedures are required to respond to unattended packages or vehicles and/or suspicious packages or vehicles. Educate and train response personnel such as bomb technicians and canine handlers on these protocols so they can more accurately assess calls and respond appropriately.
- **Command and control:** Detail activated operations centers, bomb management centers, and canine operations areas.
- **Response team protocols:** Describe the mission and activities and who will be staffing the response teams. Use the Render Safe Procedure Teams (RSP) or Hazard Assessment Teams (HAT) to respond to HAZMAT calls and Heavy Decontamination Teams to respond to decontamination/fire calls.
- **Security sweeps:** Detail how security sweeps will be conducted, who will conduct them, and when.
- **Other operational response:** Include information on resources needs including equipment or canines, technology implementation and training, threat responses, render-safe procedures, post-blast responses, intelligence, and tactical medics.

### **BEST PRACTICE**

Consider using Hazard Assessment Teams to quickly respond to and clear suspicious packages.

### ***Toolkit References***


The following checklist (found in Appendix A) can be used for tactical support and explosive device response planning and operations:

- A.24 Bomb Threat Checklist, Page A-85

## **3.17 Training**

Training is a key component for protecting public safety during event operations and has been mentioned throughout this guide. Training is an important way to instill the mission and goals of the agency on all officers, emphasize important policies and procedures, and build skills and to educate staff on the expected roles, responsibilities, and performance when participating in the

event. Work closely with all stakeholders and conduct a training needs assessment to determine the types, levels, and delivery methods of training required for all personnel early in the planning phase and ensure that it is delivered and accounted for effectively, as described earlier in “Test the Operation Plan Prior to the Event.”

Training - Planning Checklist		
	Key Steps	Completed 
●	Recommend Federal Incident Management Training	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Develop an Extensive Officer-Training Curriculum	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Deliver Training in Various Forms	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Track Training Sessions	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Test Personnel Post Training	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Conduct Drills and Exercises	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Give Training Resources to Officers	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Provide the Community with Training	<input type="checkbox"/>
<b>KEY:</b> ● Large-Scale Security Events and NSSEs ▲ NSSEs		

### ● *Recommend Federal Incident Management Training*

Upon selection to host a large-scale event, all command personnel from the lead local jurisdiction and from agencies providing key areas of support, should be required to participate in Incident Command System (ICS) training as part of the National Incident Management System (NIMS).<sup>44</sup> To the extent possible, command staff from multiple agencies should attend this training together, practice it, and become comfortable with one another before the event, to ensure consistent command and control.<sup>45</sup> This valuable online training tool covers standard, on-scene, all-hazards responses and provides an opportunity for all personnel involved to have a basic understanding of command structures.

### ● *Develop an Extensive Officer-Training Curriculum*

Focus training on educating all officers of the overall security plan for the event, as well as departmental policies and procedures for interacting with crowds and demonstrators. Training is critical to ensure that all officers receive and understand the message. In addition, provide specialized training to officers in their assigned duties, including bike officers and those who are authorized to make arrests. Specialized units, such as bomb squads or Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) teams, may not need additional training, as they are typically required to participate routine training to maintain certification.

<sup>44</sup>DHS/FEMA Incident Command System training resources can be found online at <http://training.fema.gov/EMIWeb/IS/ICSResource/index.htm>.

<sup>45</sup> Braziel, Rick, Frank Straub, George Watson, and Rod Hoops. 2016. *Bringing Calm to Chaos: A Critical Incident Review of the San Bernardino Public Safety Response to the December 2, 2015, Terrorist Shooting Incident at the Inland Regional Center*. Critical Response Initiative. Washington, DC: Office of Community Oriented Policing Services.

Suggested training topics include, but are not limited to, the following:<sup>46</sup>

- Constitutional rights and mass gatherings;
- Tactics for managing and de-escalating crowds (see section 3.4 for more details);
- Command and control structures;
- Communication protocols;
- Legal issues;
- Use of specialized equipment or technologies such as credentialing software or BWC systems;
- Timekeeping and payroll; and,
- Demobilization.

Place careful consideration on the training sequence. Focus training on planned non-confrontational tactics, protocols, and strategies. These strategies will differ from federal training which tends to use worst case scenarios to educate on crowd management tactics. The lead local agency should determine how they want to effectively instill their chosen philosophy for policing for the event.

Provide specific training to supervisors as well. Such training will give supervisors a clear sense of their roles and responsibilities and increase their accountability to ensure that these tactics are adequately implemented by their subordinate staff. This training will also provide a platform for ensuring that supervisors understand the philosophy of enforcement, and the specific expectations of the host department.

### ● *Deliver Training in Various Forms*

Offer trainings at multiple times and through multiple mechanisms to ensure that all officers receive and understand the department's protocols and expectations for crowd management. Trainings should be spread across multiple platforms including: online, classroom and scenario-based tabletop exercises, and in-person drills. To highlight the importance of this training, consider having the Chief or Sheriff provide a direct message that reinforces the department's crowd management primary mission and tactics.

### ● *Track Training Sessions*

Catalogue and track all training activities so that the department can accurately manage who has completed what type of training, the associated personnel hours for payroll, and the times when outside personnel will be in town and require lodging for training sessions. Have subcommittees report to local law enforcement on their scheduled training sessions and the anticipated number of personnel participating in the sessions. Tracking training may also be important after the event to support financial reimbursement or to defend officers and the lead local agency against legal claims.

#### **BEST PRACTICE**

Develop a mechanism for tracking training sessions to ensure all officers receive the necessary training to perform their job function.

### ● *Test Personnel Post Training*

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<sup>46</sup> See Appendix A for a more detailed list of training courses that can be offered.



The lead local department must ensure that officers fully understand and absorb training on event philosophies, protocols, and plans. Implement post-tests following training sessions to assess officers' comprehension of the material and principles they are taught.

### ● *Conduct Drills and Exercises*

As stated previously in this Primer (in Section 2.2 Develop the Operational Plan), conduct training, drills, and exercises prior to the event in order to provide personnel and operations centers with opportunities to define, test, and learn their roles and proper communication mechanisms. Scenario training and exercises and drills can prepare officers to remain unresponsive to demonstrators that try to bait and elicit negative responses. Online trainings can also ease the burden on providing out-of-town officers before they get on-site and help reinforce the local laws and policies and procedures. Examples for delivering training include presentations, webinars, online course curriculum, or in-person training at an academy. Lesson and instructional training can also include specific scenarios and exercises that resemble actual or probable events. Drills and exercises also allow personnel from various agencies to test the efficacy of the operational plan, to build collaborative relationships, and to ensure that they are aware of their roles and responsibilities.

### ● *Give Training Resources to Officers*

During the event, provide officers with a field or "pocket" guide that they can quickly refer to for answers regarding basic security functions, including the lead local department's use of force policy and arrest procedures; information on medical illnesses; information on identifying and preliminarily addressing hazardous materials; maps depicting the event zone, comfort stations and R&R sites, and the public viewing area; a list of items prohibited citywide; and radio and social media communication protocols. This is valuable in minimizing the amount of questions field supervisors receive from their officers, allowing them to focus on security operations.

Additional references can be provided for information the department feels is critical. For example, for the 2012 DNC and RNC, CMPD and TPD provided every officer with reference brochures and cards that listed the profile of radio channels.<sup>47</sup> This reference material served as a quick guide and as on-the-job training for using the radio and related equipment such as earpieces and microphones, and identifying call signs.

#### **BEST PRACTICE**

Develop a pocket guide for field officers to provide a quick-reference of important event-related information.

### ● *Provide the Community with Training*

#### **BEST PRACTICE**

Conduct a Citizen's Academy to provide the public with the information they need to build a positive perception of the department's security plans and efforts.

Training can also be provided to the public and community stakeholders through an event-specific Citizen's Academy. Tailor this training to a public audience and provide community leaders with the information they need to build a positive perception of the department's efforts

and to ensure public safety during the event. Training can include information lectures and scenario training on the department's mission and goals, as well as tactics and protocols for the security operation. Two weeks prior to the 2012 RNC, TPD hosted a Citizen's Academy to

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<sup>47</sup> These pocket guides can be found in Appendix A: Section 2.17 – Training.

educate community leaders on the department’s security operations. The session included scenarios of incidents that have occurred in past protests, and the law enforcement response to these different types of incidents, including the escalating levels of violence.

### **Toolkit References**

The following references (found in Appendix A) can be used for planning and operations for training:

- A.25 Training and Exercise Course Catalogue Checklist, Page A-87
- A.26 Training Request Form, Page A-91
- A.27 Law Enforcement Pocket Guides. Page A-93

## **3.18 Transportation and Traffic Management**

Transportation is critical to security for a large-scale event and is often one of the major elements that will quickly impact attendees’ impressions of the event’s organization, security, command, and control.

<b>Transportation and Traffic Management - Planning Checklist</b>		
	<b>Key Steps</b>	<b>Completed</b> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
●	Collaborate with Other Stakeholders	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Develop an Operational Plan for Transportation	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Be Flexible	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Separate Traffic Command into Smaller Activities	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Use Officers, Signage, and Other Resources to Guide Traffic	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Coordinate Specialized Transportation for VIP/Delegate Buses	<input type="checkbox"/>
<b>KEY:</b> ● Large-Scale Security Events and NSSEs ▲ NSSEs		

### **● Collaborate with Other Stakeholders**

The impact on a jurisdiction’s transportation system can be effectively minimized through comprehensive and early planning. Transportation planners, likely led by the local Department of Transportation, city/regional public transportation providers, and police department, must work together to coordinate motorcade and waterway route security for the safe transportation of VIPs and event participants, as well as to develop a plan for the control, diversion/rerouting of pedestrian and commercial traffic, and to continue deliveries and services such as garbage, cleaning, maintenance, etc. to the event venue and other companies and businesses in the secure zone. Planners should hold meetings and have direct access to stakeholders with operational areas affected by transportation to ensure proper coordination of transportation needs. This may include collaboration with sworn officers and civilian entities from the following:

#### **BEST PRACTICE**

Work with other subcommittees to understand their transportation needs, and the impact that these needs will have in developing the transportation plan.

- **Crowd management, civil disturbance, or arrest processing** for demonstrators blocking roads.
- **Intelligence/counter surveillance** for intelligence on changing routes.
- **Dignitary/VIP protection** for managing and coordinating their routes.
- **Explosive device response/HAZMAT** for responding to suspicious packages found on routes.
- **Fire/health/medical personnel** for event patrons or officers with heat exhaustion and/or dehydration.
- **Interagency communications** for maintaining coordinated communication and situational awareness with public transportation and deliveries and services such as garbage, cleaning, maintenance, etc. to the event venue and other companies and businesses in the secure zone.
- **Venue security** for effective and efficient access to event venues.
- **Airspace security** for effective and efficient access to airports.

#### **BEST PRACTICE**

Work with city traffic engineers to design rolling detours and/or road closures.

In addition, planners can use the expertise of city traffic personnel, particularly local traffic

engineers, for designing rolling detours and/or road closures. While local law enforcement works with city traffic planners, it should be mindful that city traffic planners are not police officers and do not recognize the challenges police face in terms of staffing for a change in roadway patterns.

#### ● *Develop an Operational Plan for Transportation*

Transportation and traffic plans will depend on the area perimeters designated by the lead law enforcement agency as secured zones. The following traffic considerations should be detailed in plans:

- **Road closures:** Include plans for secure “hard zones” and equipment/signage needed for rolling detours and/or road closures. Produce user-friendly maps and websites, FAQs, and hold town hall meetings to educate outsiders of planned road closures.
- **Transit assets:** Determine operational status of mass transit systems, ride-sharing services such as Uber and Lyft, bike-rental services, and other transit assets that will be used to transport attendees and demonstrators; and, nearby parking facilities. Additionally, consider emerging transit possibilities such as autonomous vehicles and how they will affect transportation. Designate parking lots within the “hard zones” for housing buses used for VIP and delegate transportation.
- **Staffing plans:** Detail plans for traffic posts and directing traffic. Evaluate how many officers are required and what key intersections need to be staffed. Remember that controlling traffic is a basic function that volunteers, civilian staff, reserve officers, or police officers from outside of the area can manage. Also consider staffing plans for outside route security to protect delegates/VIPs staying farther from main event areas.
- **Command and control:** Designate a site where traffic commanders will control and monitor traffic. During the 2016 DNC in Philadelphia, the Transportation Cell had a customized dashboard that included information regarding where each DNC bus was, the traffic flow in and around Philadelphia, the number of available ambulances and their locations, and other pertinent Fire/EMS information.

- **Technologies:** Detail the use of camera and GPS systems for traffic surveillance.
- **Communications plans:** Detail protocols and mechanisms for personnel to communicate during the event. If radios will be provided to bus drivers, ensure that someone in the Transportation Cell and/or EOC has the ability to contact each of the radios and ensure that bus drivers and security personnel have their radios on and respond while on duty.
- **Contingency plans:** Design a number of contingency or alternate traffic routes in the event of demonstrations, significant traffic, or other roadblocks. During the 2016 DNC in Philadelphia, the Transportation Cell partnered with the City of Philadelphia's Department of Transportation to devise multiple traffic plans for the event. Decisions regarding how to control traffic and expected movement of delegates, with considerable attention to bus movement, were factored into the traffic plans. Traffic officers particularly around the Wells Fargo Center, had multiple ways to direct buses to and from the event.
- **Transportation of large groups of VIPs or delegates:** Create secure motorcade routes early on, using educated estimates of anticipated traffic activities. Develop protocols to sweep VIP or delegate buses to ensure that they are clean. Make sure vehicles are accessible to individuals with special access and functional needs.

### ● *Be Flexible*

During the event, flexibility and frequent communication are critical for efficient real-time operations, and facilitate command-level decision making. The use of mobile relief squads on motorcycles or patrol cars can speed up responses to traffic-specific needs.

### ● *Separate Traffic Command into Smaller Activities Overseen by a Single Lead*

Traffic operations encompass a multitude of widely differing activities. Break up the following traffic functions into separate subcommittees, each with a single commander: traffic management, motorcades, and buses for VIPs. This will allow commanders to focus their attention to activities related to a single function and will prevent particular incidents from being overlooked. However, assign a single traffic lead to oversee all of the smaller activities. While breaking up the traffic functions allows commanders to focus their attention to activities related to a single function, there should be an individual that oversees all decisions to ensure that decisions made by one commander don't conflict with those of another commander, that all traffic operations are coordinated, and that all contractors and stakeholders have one individual with whom to communicate. That person should have direct connections and communication with the Transportation Cell and the overall EOC, and should be stationed in one of the two during the event.

### ● *Use Officers, Signage, and Other Resources to Guide Traffic*

Strategically disperse volunteers, civilian staff, reserve officers, and/or traffic officers at street intersections to help guide traffic. Provide each officer with detailed maps and directions informing them of major street closures, one-way streets, checkpoints, and designated parking lots for different vehicles and purposes. This will help guide officers who are unfamiliar with the local area or new traffic protocols, thus promoting smooth flows of traffic. It is important to ensure that enough staff is assigned to producing advanced materials prior to the event. Station adequate signage to direct traffic to checkpoints and exits and use physical barriers, such as jersey barriers and large vehicles like garbage trucks or school buses, to cordon off street

traffic. Strategically placed barriers and signs can effectively inform and direct vehicles trying to navigate the area and prevent traffic back-ups that could compromise the safety of the event environment.

● *Coordinate Specialized Transportation for VIP/Delegate Buses*

VIPs or delegates—in the case of national political conventions—will require secure transportation. When coordinating such transportation, local law enforcement should work closely with event planners and private companies hired to transport VIPs, to ensure that all parties fully understand transportation plans, protocols, equipment like GPS and radios, and routes.

Develop protocols to sweep VIP or delegate buses to ensure that they are clean and safe prior to the event. Work with event planners to ensure that vehicles are accessible to individuals with access and functional needs, to avoid complications with having to identify additional secure resources to transport these individuals during the event.

In some cases, law enforcement may need to help coordinate transportation. It is important that field commanders are on-hand with proper communication mechanisms to mitigate travel problems.

**Toolkit References**

The following template (found in Appendix A) can be used for planning and operations to manage transportation and traffic:

- A.26 Traffic and Transportation Plan Template, Page A-107

An additional reference that contains useful information for planning for transportation and traffic management:

- U.S. Department of Transportation Federal Highway Administration, *National Special Security Events: Transportation Planning for Planned Special Events*, Washington, D.C., May 2011.

**3.19 Preparing for Emerging Technologies and Possibilities**

In order to fully prepare for a large-scale security event, law enforcement should carefully evaluate all aspects of the potential uses and implications of cutting-edge and emerging technologies and applications (apps). Whether agencies are considering leveraging these technologies or apps, or accounting for the impacts they may have on various plans and enforcement, myriad possibilities must be thoughtfully vetted and considered.

Emerging Technologies and Possibilities - Planning Checklist		
	Key Steps	Completed <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
●	Prepare/Plan for Law Enforcement Use	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Prepare/Plan for Community Use	<input type="checkbox"/>
●	Prepare/Plan to Counter Illicit Use	<input type="checkbox"/>
<b>KEY:</b> ● Large-Scale Security Events and NSSEs ▲ NSSEs		

## ● *Prepare/Plan for Law Enforcement Use*

New and emerging technologies are constantly advancing the capabilities and operations of law enforcement. During the RNC, the Cleveland Division of Police used body worn cameras (BWCs) to improve transparency as they protected the Convention. To remain relevant in an ever-changing environment, law enforcement must do its due diligence to determine if leveraging cutting edge technologies during large-scale security events makes sense, and if so, which technologies they will use and how. For example, small unmanned aircraft systems (sUAS) have the ability to, “among other benefits, help find lost persons, protect police officers during searches for armed suspects...and aid in disaster relief and recovery.”<sup>48</sup> During Super Bowl XLV in 2011, the Arlington (Texas) Police Department utilized a sUAS to conduct security and to visually inspect the roof of AT&T Stadium before and during the game. While neither of the Presidential Nominating Convention host cities used sUAS, they are technologies that could have considered to conduct security of their arenas, provide situational awareness to their EOCs, and keep both officers and the community safe.<sup>49</sup> Going forward, another technology to consider for use are autonomous vehicles that have the potential to expand the capacities of law enforcement by delivering resources without requiring an officer to transport them. During LSSEs, autonomous vehicles can transport pallets of water from the Forward Logistics Base to officers throughout the city, and to demonstrators in some cases, without requiring additional personnel.

### **BEST PRACTICE**

The 2016 RNC was the first national convention in which police officers were equipped with body worn cameras (BWCs). All CPD officers are standard issued BWCs and were required to wear them when working RNC events. CPD kept its standard BWC policy and procedure in place for the large event, but ordered specially designed mounts so that crowd management and arrest team officers could also wear BWCs that could accommodate their protective equipment.

BJA provides a variety of valuable resources for law enforcement using BWCs. The toolkit can be found at <https://www.bja.gov/bwc/topics-gettingstarted.html>.

However, as with the implementation of any new technology law enforcement agencies must prepare and plan for more than just use and cost. Especially prior to an LSSE, agencies must account for the additional time and resources needed to develop and vet detailed policies, procedures, and operating guidelines; conduct the necessary trainings; and, involve the community in meetings regarding their use.<sup>50</sup>

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<sup>48</sup> Ibid. Downloaded from <https://www.policefoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/UAS-Report.pdf>.

<sup>49</sup> Ibid.

<sup>50</sup> A full checklist for developing policy and procedures can be found beginning on page 45 of <https://www.policefoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/UAS-Report.pdf>. Additionally, the International Association of Chiefs of Police developed a Technology Policy Framework that includes nine universal principles for, “the development of specific agency policies and operating procedures that comport with established constitutional, legal, and ethical mandates and standards,” which can be found at, <http://www.theiacp.org/portals/0/documents/pdfs/iacp%20technology%20policy%20framework%20january%202014%20final.pdf>.



### ● *Prepare/Plan for Community Use*

With the emergence of any new technology, it is also important for law enforcement agencies, in particular, to prepare for the ways in which community members may use technologies and apps, and plan for the potential impacts of their use. For example, although ridesharing apps—such as Uber or Lyft—provide an additional mode of transportation, their method of matching a vehicle to the requesting user can cause difficulties for traffic enforcement plans. During the 2016 DNC, the Philadelphia Police Department provided a specific parking lot in the Wells Fargo Center complex for taxi use. However, since ridesharing companies were only approved a couple of days before the DNC, inclusion of them was not considered in traffic plans.<sup>51</sup> Instead of drivers being directed to a specific parking lot, riders met their driver based on their phone’s GPS, regardless of where they were located. This resulted in situations where multiple rows of drivers were waiting for their riders, and riders walked through multiple lanes of traffic attempting to find their drivers. This created not only a safety concern, but also significant delays in the flow of traffic around the Wells Fargo Center, which impacted other methods of transportation. Similarly, autonomous vehicles that have the physical location of a particular venue will not be able to read directions to specific parking lots and should be accounted for in law enforcement plans once they become used frequently by the public. Technology will continue to evolve leading up to the 2020 Presidential Nominating Conventions and other LSSEs. Law enforcement must account for how the public will use these technologies as they relate to these events.

### ● *Prepare/Plan to Counter Illicit Use*

Finally, law enforcement agencies must prepare and plan for countering the use of technologies and apps that can be leveraged for illicit purposes. While autonomous vehicles have numerous positive attributes, an individual or group looking to do harm to a large number of individuals could use autonomous vehicles to cause mass damage to an LSSE venue or to a nearby crowd of attendees. Likewise, UASs may be used in various ways to surveil, transport contraband or cause damage. Identifying specific protocols for countering these possibilities will be an important process for local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies working together to address.

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<sup>51</sup> Democratic National Convention – After Action Review (AAR). City of Philadelphia. September 19, 2016.



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# Section 4: Post-event Considerations

## 4.1 Demobilization

At the end of a large-scale security event, it is important to ensure that demobilization plans are in place to prevent out-of-town personnel from not checking out properly and for local agencies to not close down their operations prematurely. In fact, properly closing operations and bringing business back to normal is critical for ensuring community safety.

Begin demobilization efforts during the planning stages and continue throughout the event life-cycle. Law enforcement agencies must decide on a logical order to release and out-process officers and to collect resources coming back in from the field including their equipment, supplies, and any vehicles. Designate a point of contact to release personnel and resources. In addition, as officers are out-processed, they should be required to submit completed timecards and travel information, so that local law enforcement and the SAA can accurately complete payroll for visiting personnel.

### LESSON LEARNED

Exit interviews with out-of-town personnel should occur prior to relieving the agency.

In addition, barricades, fences, and other resources used to secure perimeters and mobile command or medical sites must be disassembled in a timely manner and temporary adjustments to critical infrastructure must be made so that normal city operations can resume.

## 4.2 After-Action Analysis

### BEST PRACTICE

After-action analysis should begin in the planning phase. The City of Philadelphia and USSS were able to continue best practices and implement lessons learned from the Papal Visit/World Meeting of Families in 2015 to their plan for the DNC in 2016 as a result of conducting a stakeholder-wide debrief. The need for a single Traffic Lead also came out of conducting an after-action analysis of hosting the DNC.

The after-action process is a critical step to evaluate and better understand a host jurisdiction's performance—including strengths and areas for improvement—following any major event or large operational activation. Begin the evaluation process in conjunction with other pre-event planning activities. Evaluators and subject matter experts (SMEs) and executive staff from previous large-scale events and NSSEs should participate in the pre-event design discussions to ensure that the post-event analysis accurately captures all phases of the planning and operational processes. For the most accurate evaluation, evaluators, SMEs, and executive staff should come from both internal and external sources, to ensure a diverse perspective. This should include both City and

out-of-state law enforcement and non-law enforcement personnel, and government and community members. Evaluators should be chosen based on their expertise in operational activities or the standard operating procedures for the venue/site that they will observe.

Evaluators will observe the event at specific venues/sites that have roles and responsibilities related to the host jurisdiction's objectives or areas of focus. At each site, evaluators will need to record performance capabilities and capture any unresolved issues. They will also ensure that data is collected whenever possible to support their after-action analyses. The City of

Philadelphia was able to learn a lot about its communication and consideration of local businesses through debriefs and engagement with business owners and community members following the 2015 Papal Visit/World Meeting of Families. Some of these lessons learned were addressed during the DNC.

Following the event, evaluators should take part in a hotwash and/or de-briefing, which consists of a facilitated discussion held immediately after an event. This hotwash will allow the evaluators the opportunity to capture feedback about any issues, concerns, or proposed improvements. It is also an opportunity for all individuals involved in the event to express their opinions, which will later be incorporated into the overall after-action report. Doing the debrief immediately after an event allows for people to remember specific details and incidents before they are forgotten or seem to be irrelevant. Additionally, too far after the event people may have more pertinent concerns and not attend the debrief. The team of evaluators will compile and analyze all of the data collected to assess outcomes related to pre-identified operational areas. The data will include the evaluators' notes, details from the information-sharing portal—both 2016 Presidential Nominating Convention cities used Knowledge Center—and any other materials or documents produced at their location that may add to the analysis process. Data-consolidation is an important first step in the analysis, and it documents what happened during the exercise. It also supports the evaluators in determining *why* events happened, by providing the necessary data to determine root causes.<sup>52</sup> The analysis will highlight all observations deemed most relevant for the jurisdiction to have the best overall report of their activities throughout the event process.

The main products of the evaluation process and analysis are a timeline, or reconstruction, of key events and an after-action report (AAR). The timeline record consists of key events, decisions, and resource deployments, which may prove important post-event. The AAR captures observations of the event and will include recommendations, best practices, and lessons learned for post-event improvements.

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<sup>52</sup> A “root cause” is the causal factor of an identified issue, as uncovered during detailed analysis, toward which the evaluators can direct recommendations.

## Section 5: Conclusion

Operations of previous large-scale events such as NSSEs have provided valuable lessons learned and best practices that can inform, prepare, and better equip planners, senior leaders, and decision-makers hosting events in their own jurisdiction. These events pose the potential for large gatherings and demonstrations, clashes between police and demonstrators, and an increased risk to officer safety. Recognize that different tactics, strategies, and a common philosophy should be used to ensure the safety of attendees, demonstrators, and officers assisting in the response. The strategic vision should focus on local law enforcement's ability to effectively maintain security and public safety, with special attention paid to minimizing disruptions caused by demonstrators, avoiding unnecessary arrests, and preserving Constitutional rights and civil liberties.

### Build a Foundation for Success

To establish a foundation of success for this vision, it is critical that law enforcement begin with early planning, clear leadership, and a comprehensive operational plan that incorporates the needs and response efforts of all participating stakeholders. Planning should include the identification of core operational areas applicable to the event, 18 of which were outlined in this report. These core areas will guide the agency as it determines staffing requirements and recruits police officers both from within and outside of their jurisdiction. These officers are vital to providing safety to event venues, critical infrastructure sites, delegates/VIPs, and event attendees. As planning proceeds, maintain coordinated and open lines of communication and a flexible mentality toward expected changes during planning and operations.

### Highlighted Strategies

Some of the notable strategies discussed in this report highlight the importance of using both traditional and non-traditional approaches to policing, include:

- Develop a strategic vision that combines engagement, protection of civil rights and liberties, and public and officer safety and effectively communicate it to officers and the public
- Use bicycles and bicycle officers as a more welcoming and approachable law enforcement presence and to guide demonstrators
- Leverage on-site personnel (both uniformed and undercover), information and intelligence gathered by operations centers, and technology (body-worn, dashboard, security, surveillance, and news cameras; social media and the Internet; and, information-sharing software) to maintain situational awareness and make real-time response and resource-allocation decisions.
- Promote a shift in officer training for crowd control and non-confrontational strategies to maintain officer composure. In addition, training is crucial for ensuring that all law enforcement offices and other stakeholders understand their strategic vision to minimize arrests; deescalate situations whenever possible; and provide a safe, secure environment for all who choose to operate within those parameters.

## **Public Information and Media Relations**

Since large-scale events can draw media attention and demonstrators from across the nation, carefully planned security operations are critical to maintaining a safe environment for event goers and for deescalating potentially violent situations.

Gathering and disseminating information in real-time and using multiple communications channels (including press releases, press conferences, conference calls, and social media) to do so can facilitate timely and unified sharing of information. Clear and consistent public information is crucial for ensuring that demonstrators exercise their right to free speech, while also functioning within clearly defined parameters, and for satisfying the media. Create a city JIC to streamline these communications and ensure rapid response to media outlets and the public.

## **Additional Resources, Templates, and Checklists**

Proper security planning and multi-agency coordination throughout the entirety of the event (before, during, and after) are paramount to local law enforcement's ability to maintain a safe environment and to conduct a successful event.

Law enforcement agencies nationwide can benefit from the lessons learned and best practices that are documented in this Planning Primer. An interactive toolkit is provided in **Appendix A**, which serves as a useful instrument for developing operational plans. By having solid plans in place, law enforcement will be better prepared for incidents and to achieve event goals, such as reduced response times, reduced civil unrest, and a heightened sense of public safety throughout a large-scale event.